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I. INTRODUCTION
It seems to me that women almost always lose. And so do
Unions. But they are not common crusaders. There have been
a myriad of struggles involving women and unions-and these
struggles are always about power. Unfortunately, from my per-
spective, both groups have in common a dearth of power, espe-
cially in these recessionary times. Neither organized labor' nor
females' have been blessed in this era of new prosperity,
trickle-down theories, and neo-individualism. One could posit
that a likely goal of most of those with the power in this country
is to keep the labor and the women's movement divided; to
minimize the similarities between the two struggles and dimin-
ish the sense of commonality that may lead them to joint
efforts.
In the context of the cases discussed in this paper, the dis-
pute appears to be between divorced women with custody of
their children, and their ex-husbands, who fail to support them.
In actuality, the dispute is an example of the primacy of institu-
tional authority, which favors those with the most power (and,
coincidentally, money) over both women and working-class
men. In this paper, I discuss why it is wrong to ask unions to
help the state collect child-support from their members who
have failed to pay. Theoretically, I favor any effort that helps
custodial parents, usually women, take care of their children.
What I oppose is the discriminatory enforcement of child sup-
port obligations against men who have joined unions to
improve their market bargaining power, at a time when oppos-
1. PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 108-14 (1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers' Rights to Self-organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769
(1983).
2. WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FORJOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 24
(Donald Treiman & Heidi Hartmann eds., 1981) ("researchers have
consistently found that a substantial part of the earnings difference cannot be
explained by factors thought to measure productivity differences. Taken at
face value, these results create a presumption of additional factors at work,
possibly including institutional barriers and discrimination"); see, e.g., Mary
Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979).
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ing unionization has become, once again, fashionable and
respectable because of the factual and political climate in this
country.3 I also oppose such collection efforts not only because
they are discriminatory, but also because they create a false
impression that something is actually being done to help these
poor mothers.
Many commentators and students of society support the
special struggles endemic to both women and unions; these
sympathizers recognize that each has more in common with
than in opposition to the other. Unfortunately, the barons of
labor are well-known for their celebrated and frequent antipa-
thy to the fiscal and social plight of women.4 Women have
always been an integral part of the labor movement,5 but they
have not equally benefitted by its achievements. The highest
paid union members are, by and large, males6 and there is little
3. See Robert LaLonde & Bernard Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions:
Another Look at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953
(1991) (noting that although there appears to be increased employer
violations of the National Labor Relations Act, it is due to leaner economic
times).
4. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C.
1973), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (class action of female flight
attendants for pay equal to that of male flight attendants); ELLEN FRANKEH
PAUL, EQUITY AND GENDER, THE COMPARABLE WORTH DEBATE (1989);
WILLIAM F. PEPPER & FLORENCE R. KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT (1981). One of the first times the Supreme Court considered
the associational rights of unions was in the context of determining whether a
state law that prohibited race discrimination violated a union's constitutional
rights. The Railway Mail Association offered membership to "[a]ny regular
male Railway Postal Clerk or male substitute Railway Postal Clerk ... who is
of the Caucasian race, or a native American Indian .... " Railway Mail Ass'n v.
Corsi, 326 U.S. 89, 91 n.3 (1945); see also Clyde W. Summers, The Right to Join
a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33, 34 (1947) ("Eight unions have been found
which have constitutional provisions excluding women, but it is generally
believed that exclusion of women is more widespread than this number
would indicate.").
5. F. Ray Marshall, The Act's Impact on Employment, Society and the National
Economy, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 16, 24 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987). Unions had to
deal with
the increased labor force participation rates of women, who are
generally are less well-organized than men and whose presence as
permanent, integral parts of the work force put pressure on
traditional work rules and compensation systems oriented to male
heads of households and based on the assumption that women were
temporary peripheral labor market participants.
See also CAROLYN ASHBAUGH, LUCY PARSONS: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
(1976); WITH BABIES & BANNERS: THE STORY OF THE WOMEN'S EMERGENCY
BRIGADE (New Day Films 1978).
6. See PAUL, supra note 4; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
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direct evidence that unions have as a goal to end the female
claim to being the most impoverished class.7
The peculiar context of two recent California cases, In re
Marriage of Wilson 8 and Senecker and the Butchers Union Local 532
pits women against unions in a unique way. The California
Court of Appeal has had to decide what to do when a father
who refuses to pay child support-a woefully common phe-
nomenon-secures his employment through the services of his
union-operated hiring hall. In each of the two cases, on the
motion of the state attorney general, the court ordered the
union joined as a defendant in a family law action, for the lim-
ited purpose of advising the court of the name and address of
any employer to whom a delinquent father has been referred
for work. The delinquents were not financially unable to pay;
each was employed. They, however, changed jobs so fre-
quently that the state statutory provision for automatic wage
deduction was useless.
Feminists ought to celebrate any judicial endorsement of
creative efforts to make fathers pay."0 At the same time, union-
ists may smart at what appears to be another affront to the
political dignity and potency of organized labor. And skeptics
can be rightfully concerned that such activism and stridency in
COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK AND GUIDE TO SOURCES: STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1990 (110th ed. 1991). In 1988, there were
11,019 men in unions, as compared to 5,982 women in unions. The wage
difference is equally dramatic, with men earning $21,218 to women's average
annual salary of $16,380. Id. at 419 (extrapolated from table).
7. "Exclusion of Negroes, aliens, and women has been motivated
primarily by a desire to eliminate these particular sources of notoriously
cheap labor as potential job takers." Summers, supra note 4, at 36. Although
motivated by institutional and financial survival, it appears that the union
movement has lately focused upon women workers as organizers and objects
of organization. See, e.g., American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th
Cir. 1990); Women Seen as Source of Growth for Labor Movement, LAB. REL. WKLY.,
Sept. 19, 1990, at 859.
8. 257 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1989).
9. Senecker and the Butcher's Union Local 532, at 42450 Ct. No.
123668 (Cal. App. 1990) (unpublished decision). Neither case offers a
complete factual background; the courts dealt with each application rather
summarily.
10. My male colleagues are universally shocked at my concern about
the instant efforts to collect. Law often can be only a series of band-aids used
to try to improve social health when the overwhelming and radical changes
that are necessary to find a cure are impossible to make. But, somehow, as
Regina Austin eloquently describes in her article on being a woman of color,
"I know that I am not just flying off the handle, seeing imaginery insults and
problems where there are none." Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIs.
L. REV. 539, 540.
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collecting delinquent child support, though apt in any case,
seems to be strangely lacking in almost every other context,
since nearly one-half of all noncustodial fathers" do not com-
ply with court orders to pay child support. No one ought to
object to any effort that results in greater enforcement of
parental financial obligation, even if it is only through inconsis-
tent ardor. It is certainly better to get a few dollars more for a
few more children than to be consistently but fairly inefficient.
But one might query whether the system is more likely to take
on the weak and least favored defendants, for example labor
unions, on behalf of another powerless group-unsupported
mother/caretakers-who rarely inspire such militant advocacy.
Furthermore, however inconsistently and dispassionately,
labor unions have helped improve the working lives of women.
It would make some sense, rather than prohibiting this type of
aggressive enforcement, to use it consistently and apply it
equally across the board. However, it is only available because
of the father's status as union member, which creates the
problem.
The judicial decisions to join a union in a family law dis-
pute-however tangentially-raises questions about motivation
and effect. I have no sympathy for a father who does not sup-
port his children. But there are ways to make him do it that do
not implicate his labor union. More efficient and efficacious
collection, for example, a program where the family law court
and not the destitute, unsupported mother, begins delinquency
proceedings, has netted more money for needy children. 2
Better lawyering, faster-acting judges who move parties and
their attorneys along when the support of children is at stake,
and who set decent support levels in the first place, all would
seem to help get some of these children, whose fathers refuse
to support them, out of poverty. Jail-as a threat or a real alter-
native for delinquent fathers-can motivate a parent to support
his child. The particular actions in Senecker and Wilson, while
11. K. Eckhardt, Social Change, Legal Controls, & Child Support: A
Study in the Sociology of Law (1965) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Wisconsin), cited in DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY 71 (1979);
STERNMAN & DAVIS, DIVORCE AWARDS & OUTCOMES: A STUDY OF PATTERN &
CHANGE IN CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, 1965-1978, at 8 (1981). In this case, at
least, a gender generalization is appropriate: most mothers have the children
and most fathers have the money. The latest amendments to federal child
support laws, including automatic wage deductions payable to the family law
court for the benefit of the children whose custodial parent is awarded
support, vastly improved the post-1989 collection rate but no percentages are
yet available.
12. See generally CHAMBERS, supra note 11.
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laudatory as an aggressive effort to make fathers pay, do not
represent a modality that least interferes with other important
social, political, and personal interests. On the contrary, such
suits at least raise the specter of interference with federal statu-
tory and constitutional rights. Further, there is some reason to
doubt whether such interference actually works to the benefit
of the poor mother, on whose behalf the court is arguably
treading on constitutional and statutory rights."3 Even if such a
collection mechanism can work, these orders illustrate the kind
of disparate and unreasoned judicial responses that worry me.
The social and political impact of this disparate enforce-
ment of mothers' rights and the somewhat suspicious choice of
a labor union as a handmaiden to the king in his collection and
protection efforts is not amenable to proof through empirical
data. In cases too numerous to mention, but well-known
among plaintiffs' lawyers and academics who study the laws
against discrimination, discriminatory intent is very difficult to
prove, and defenses that suggest a legitimate business reason,
despite the fact that a woman or an African-American or a
union supporter lost a job, often carry the day in court for the
alleged discriminator.' 4 The reason writers complain about the
system, and its inherent inequities, is that change requires a
modification in a belief-system, and the rejection of policies
that impair people's chances of ever achieving equality under
law.' 5 The worry about interference, both on constitutional
13. I concede that a union could, practically, comply with such an
order, which would give the states' attorney the chance to establish a wage
deduction from the start of the delinquent's employment, assuming that the
delinquent takes the job to which he is referred. One must further assume
that union timely advises the court; the court must then promptly enter an
order for automatic wage deduction, which must be expedited to the new/
current employer of the delinquent. With any luck, the delinquent will still
be there. However, that creates the possibility that, were the union to fail to
comply with a Wilson order, it may be sued in negligence. In the discussion,
infra pp. xx-xx, of hiring halls, it is clear that many such halls have no regular
procedure or professional staff to handle referrals.
There are also serious questions as to whom the plaintiff in such a
negligence action could be. Is this yet another legal expense for the
impoverished mother? Could the state hold the union in contempt? In
addition, a union could raise a tenable preemption argument, since unions
qua unions are rarely held liable for simple negligence. See United
Steelworkers v. Rawson, 110 S. Ct. 1904 (1990). Again, a new cycle of
treating unions differently than others, for example, employers who fail to
withhold, raise all the same issues discussed herein.
14. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
15. Justice Holmes' observation is apt here:
[P]erhaps one of the reasons why judges do not like to discuss
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and federalism grounds, with the right of unions to be left
alone, can be no more directly addressed. The joinder orders
of the appellate court seem impermissible because they: (1)
require the disclosure of confidential union information which
would deprive unions and their members of their derivative
First Amendment right of association; (2) facially discriminate
between union members and others; (3) impose upon the pri-
vacy rights of the union and its members; (4) collide with the
comprehensive regulation of labor relations which Congress
has declared a strictly federal concern, emanating from the
Commerce Clause; and (5) work detriment to the declared fed-
eral policy (in statutory language if not in practice in the laissez
faire 1980s and 1990s) to encourage collectivization among
workers.
Although it "feels" wrong to make the union cooperate
with a family law court, and that feeling, I argue, ought to be
sufficient to justify a court's decision not to use such a dubious
collection mechanism, there is little legal precedent to prove
interference with the constitutional or federal statutory rights
of either the unions or their members. Any lawyer, however,
could argue that the instant cases are unique and that there is
something to worry about.' 6 As the law stands now, the consti-
tutional right of workers to associate free from government
restraint and inquiry may not extend to a case where a member
asks that his union not help the state collect delinquent child
support. And state family law is often excepted from federal
control because of the historical right of parens patriae. Were
this an ideal world, where law and sociology, rather than law
and economics, were the standard, a court would hesitate
before it entered an order like those in Wilson and Senecker.' 7
questions of policy, or put a decision in terms upon their views as
law-makers, is that the moment you leave the path of merely logical
deduction you lose the illusion of certainty which makes legal
reasoning seem like mathematics .... Views of policy are taught by
experience of the interests of life. Those interests are fields of
battle.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7
(1894).
16. When Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), was decided, there
was precious little precedent to help a woman argue that she was being
denied the right to earn a living, a right that only men enjoyed. It really was
not until last term, when the Court decided that fetal protection policies
discriminate against women in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. 1196
(1991), that women could claim that case law supported their right to work,
regardless of their fecundity.
17. Surely then we would have been spared Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall) 30 (1872), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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This particular collection effort presents a conundrum.
Consequently, while much of this discussion deals with why the
California Court of Appeal is arguably correct in joining the
unions, substantial discussion centers on what forces militate
against those orders. My own opinion is that no court should
be allowed to do what the California Court of Appeal did. The
court's action advances women only at the expense of men who
belong to unions, without trying to achieve the goal of univer-
sal child-support and without injury to anyone because of his
labor association.
While refusing to concur with the decisions, it is fair to say
that one reading of the case law would support their legality.
Although both the union's and the member's goals are often
political, the union is joined in this case as an entity with whom
the delinquent father has a relationship analogous to a contract
for economic gain-i.e., job referral-and the release of
employment referral information in this discrete factual con-
text may work no injury to the union's ostensible raison d'etre:
organizing employees for political and economic advantage.'
8
Despite constitutional endowment of union associational
rights, a court reading extant jurisprudence could conclude
that the Wilson and Senecker orders do not reach the level of
"significantly interfering"' 9 with those associational interests; a
standard which the Supreme Court has required to invalidate
certain acts that impact upon first amendment rights. Although
unions have a privacy right, the limited nature of the informa-
tion the state asks the union to release here arguably, in com-
parison with those cases where information asked of unions
was patently "private," may not impinge upon this privacy.
Nor would federalism, which in its purest form demands
preemption of any state law which offends the management by
the federal government of relations constitutionally or statuto-
rily subject to the exclusive control of Congress, automatically
preclude the issuance of the Wilson and Senecker orders. First,
the state's interest in enforcing personal child support orders is
largely unconnected with labor relations, which in every case
involves the intercourse between employees and their unions
or employers. Second, even the broadest reaches of preemp-
18. However, the union is in no way the delinquent's employer. It owes
him no money which could and should be attached for the support of his
children.
19. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987) (requiring a club to admit women does not "significantly interfere"
with and is no substantial threat to members' associational rights, since they
were not required to "abandon or alter" any of their activities or basic goals).
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tion demarcate those areas peripheral to labor relations and of
enormous and historic local concern, as exceptions to the rule.
Finally, congressional proscription of acts that discourage col-
lectivization is directed at private employers, not at state action.
Even if the National Labor Relations Act, which codifies those
proscriptions, should apply by analogy to enforcement actions
by the several states because of the NLRA's clear embodiment
of federal policy, compliance with the California Appeal
Courts' orders would not, except in an indirect way, discourage
unionism.
Moreover, even the sacrosanctity of federal labor law has
been cast aside where it appears to violate the purposes of laws
that relate to the protection of family interests. For years
before the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)-a federal law imposed, on all employers-was
amended to allow alienation of retirement benefits to satisfy
child support obligations, some courts found that pension
money ought to be available for such use. They reached this
result, even though ERISA has the clearest and broadest articu-
lation of federal preemption of any labor statute, and despite
the statutory proscription of alienation for any purpose.
However, in each of these areas of concern, the cases only
suggest, but do not demand, a finding that the orders against
the union are right.20 The confluence of so many potential
infringements-even where the joinder is legal within the
parameters of case precedent-indicate that the court should
not have done what it did. I may not be able to argue convinc-
ingly that the orders were unconstitutional, 2 only that they
20. It seems too narrow an approach to law, labor law especially, to
rigidly apply case precedent to a situation where politics, economics,
philosophy, and anthropology all contribute to the way things work. A legal
methods teacher in the first year of law school may be gratified that a student
would read the cases and conclude that California acted appropriately in the
instant cases; however, such formalism overlooks the other stimuli at work.
Certainly, respected scholars would disagree about what makes law happen,
and not all espouse rigorous case analysis. Cf Matthew W. Finkin, Revisionism
in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23 (1984); Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the
True, the Beautiful in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1942).
21. Cases already decided by the Supreme Court seem to contradict
that conclusion. So distinguished a panel of constitutional experts as John
Nowak, Ronald Rotunda, and Nelson Young, in their "hornbook," comment:
[I]ndividuals might associate to achieve economic or other goals that
are unconnected to any fundamental constitutional right. For
example, individuals might join together in labor unions or trade
associations. This ability to control one's economic associations is a
part of the liberty protected by due process, but the Court has
refused to substitute its judgment for the legislature's as to the
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threaten constitutional protections and statutory guarantees
sufficiently to raise questions as to their use. Senecker and Wilson
represent an unprovable point about law and power. David
and Goliath is such a popular story simply because the results
are unique, and perhaps heartening to the scores of losers who
will never fell any giants. Women may view these California
cases as good over evil, disenfranchised female over omnipo-
tent male; but they may more likely represent what happens
when two equally powerless groups go head to head. There is
also some question about whether even the remote possibility
of constitutional and federalism implications are worth the
result, since union joinder may net no real money for the
unsupported children,22 and there may be eminently more
effective ways to get the children's bills paid. Unfortunately for
unions, and for women, these alternative enforcement methods
represent attacks upon those most powerful and most like the
judges to whom the appeals for enforcement must be made:
men with money.
II. DOES A GOVERNMENT ORDER TO A UNION TO IDENTIFY
THE NAME OF AN EMPLOYER TO WHOM AN ADJUDGED
DELINQUENT FATHER HAS BEEN REFERRED INTERFERE
WITH ANY FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT A UNION OR ITS
MEMBERS MAY HAVE?
There is something troubling about making a union reveal
information about one of its members to the government. A
union has many functions, but surely none includes an obliga-
tion to help the state collect child support from non-paying,
noncustodial parents." Union members cannot use their
legitimate basis for restricting such types of association. So long as
the legislature is rationally promoting an arguably legitimate
government goal by restricting the activities of a business
association, the Court will not invalidate this legislation.
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 948 (3d ed. 1989).
22. In its unpublished decision, the court noted that Robert Senecker
worked an average of only two weeks for every employer, and that
notification of the employer and attachment of wages would have been
impossible in that time. Even with notice of the state's attorney within a few
days of a delinquent's referral, it is clear that wages may never be attached if
delinquents continue to change jobs so frequently.
23. An interesting comparison may be made to the Internal Revenue
Code, 26 U.S.C. § 21 (e)(9) (1988), which requires taxpayers who wish to take
a child care credit to provide the government with the name and social
security number of the child care provider. Although not of constitutional
dimension, certain privacy interests are ignored because of the claim of the
government of its need to raise revenues, to support, inter alia, child support
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unions to protect them from legal obligations. But a delin-
quent father should not be in a worse position than any other
employee simply because he belongs to a union.24 Union
membership ought to carry with it only the burdens that
accompany the benefits of union membership: the dues, the
subjection to internal discipline, and the participatory obliga-
tions. It ought not deprive a member of privacy, and make the
union an unwilling conduit of information about the member.
The instant cases are likely defensible because of their unique
and limiting facts, but it is no great traverse to circumstances
under which constitutional privileges may be threatened. To
go even further, simply because it is not unconstitutional or
illegal to demand such complicity of a union, does not mean it
is good policy to do so. 2 5
enforcement mechanisms. See M. Morris, The Child-Care Credit Conundrum
(unpublished manuscript on file with Northern Illinois University College of
Law).
24. Of course, the state argued that an employee whose work is had
through a union hiring hall is likely not to (and in the instant case, assuredly
did not) stay with a single employer long enough for the state to secure an
automatic wage deduction for child support. There is still a possibility that
even were the union to report to the state the identity of the employer to
whom it referred a delinquent, either the delinquent will not take, or will not
be offered the job or, that the delinquent would still not work for that
employer long enough to have his wages attached. Beyond that, there are
other ways the state could recover delinquencies-an order to the delinquent
that he either reveal his adjudged delinquencies to any employer or be held
in contempt of court is one example. That way, not only union members but
any itinerant employee would be less likely to evade familial obligation, and
there would be no distinction in treatment due entirely to union membership
status.
25. Political and social realities often mandate that the law change. For
example, more than forty years ago, Professor Clyde Summers argued that
unions ought to be made to admit blacks, women, and aliens. At the time,
such exclusionary practices were not illegal. Professor Summers reasoned
that a nineteenth century New Jersey chancery court's conclusion in Mayer v.
Journeyman Stonecutters Ass'n, 20 A. 492 (N.J. Ct. of Chanc. 1890), which
became the landmark case for sixty years and held that unions were voluntary
associations with the absolute right to deny membership to anybody, was no
longer apt in the middle of the twentieth century, when unions were powerful
economic actors. See Clyde W. Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 33, 39 (1947); cf. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 409 U.S. 228 (1989),
remanded, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (D.D.C. 1990) (large accounting firm that
discriminated against a woman because of her sex can be ordered to make
her a partner. "The fact that Price Waterhouse opposes her admission to
partnership cannot control.").
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A. Historical Treatment of Labor Unions
Unions are not popular with most capitalists. And unions
have not had an easy time of it in this country. This, despite
the fact that since the end of the nineteenth century, Congress
has been concerned about, and has attempted to dissipate, the
inequality of bargaining power between employees and
employers.2 6 Sometimes, the collective voice of our elected
representatives and the judiciary articulates belief in the invia-
ble integrity of the individual worker; 7 at other times the con-
cern is only for the efficient operation of business.28 Whatever
the motivation, it is part of our national policy to encourage
collectivization. Perhaps for this reason, if for none other,
intrusion into union affairs should be scrutinized carefully.29
26. SELIG PERLMAN, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED
STATES (1950). Congress recognized that:
It is the employer's purpose to bring in ever lower and lower
levels in competition among laborers and depress wages; it is the
purpose of the union to eliminate those lower levels and to make
them stay eliminated. That brings the union men face to face with
the whole matter of industrial control. It is essential to note that in
struggling for recognition, labor is struggling not for something
absolute, as would be a struggle for a complete dispossession of the
employer, but for the sort of an end that admits of relative
differences and gradations.
Id. at 267; see also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) ("the individ-
ual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of
contract").
27. See, e.g., Clayton Act, Act of October 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1988))
("the work of an individual is not an article of commerce .... ); American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921):
A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of
himself and his family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages
he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and
to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give
laborers an opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.
28. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
29. See, e.g., UAW v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234 (D.D.C. 1986). The
district court, although later reversed by the Supreme Court, found the
federal law disqualifying strikers and their families from receiving food
stamps unconstitutional. The court noted that strikers, at least as "a
historical matter," have "been subject to discrimination;" may be defined as a
discrete group by "obvious and distinguishing characteristics;" and have
frequently been in the stance of an unpopular political minority. Cf. Lyng v.
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 639 (1986). There is judicially noticeable scholarly
work evidencing discrimination in the form of public and official hostility
against labor unions in general, and strikers in particular. See, e.g., 18
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Trade Unionism 563, 565-66 (1987); IRVING
BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1920-
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The first American labor case to be fully reported and
remarked upon3 0 made clear the reason for the defendant
union's lack of popularity with those most powerful in the
developing nation. In his charge to the jury, the city attorney
who was prosecuting the several workers for striking for higher
wages explained:
[Tihe master employers have no particular interest in the
thing ... if they pay higher wages, you must pay higher
for the articles. They, in truth, are protecting the com-
munity .... They have no interest to serve in the prose-
cution; they have no vindictive passions to gratify, ...
they merely stand as the guardians of the community
from imposition and rapacity. 3 '
No one had yet the audacity to say "What's good for business is
good for America," but the sentiment was there just the
same.32 It may never be clear whether the legal system sup-
ports its own moneyed constituents, whose most articulate and
influential members are within society's highest economic
strata or whether it reflects the values of society as a whole.
But there was and is no doubt that the powerful and wealthiest
(save those of highly publicized graft and criminality within the
ranks of organized labor) disfavor unions.
Under English common law in the eighteenth century,
combined action by workers to raise their wages was a criminal
conspiracy.3 3 That view remained intact until the middle of the
nineteenth century. "A combination of workmen to raise their
wages may be considered from a twofold point of view: one is
to benefit themselves . . . the other is to injure those who do
1933 (1960). Indeed, there have been many legislative efforts to ameliorate
the historic discrimination against labor unions and strikers. See, e.g., 29
U.S.C. § 104 (1988) (no injunction against ceasing or refusing to work); 29
U.S.C. § 163 (1988) (preserving the right to strike).
30. Commonwealth v. Pullis, Phila. Mayor's Court (1806); 3 JOHN
RODGERS COMMONS & EUGENE ALLEN GILMORE, A DOCUMENTARY OF HISTORY
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 58-248 (1910).
31. COMMONS & GILMORE, supra note 30, at 137.
32. See, e.g., Speech by Calvin Coolidge to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors (Jan. 17, 1925) ("The chief business of the American
people is business."); Speech by Charles Erwin Wilson to the Senate Armed
Forces Committee (1952) ("What is good for the country is good for General
Motors, and what is good for General Motors is good for the country.") in
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 736, 817 (15th ed. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10
(1721); Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leech C.C. 274 (1783), cited in CHARLES E. RICE,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 76 (1962).
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not join their society. The rule of law condemns both."13 4 The
criminal conspiracy theory and the nearly universal judicial dis-
approval of any collective efforts ended, at least in one impor-
tant industrialized state, in 1842 when the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts gave its imprimatur to a strike that was lawful
both in its means-devoid of violent and trespassory activity-
and its end-to achieve higher wages for the particular workers
so combined. 5 At once, the court legalized strikes that sought
improvements in wages and working conditions of the workers
who struck, and disapproved any indirect political action by
those same workers.
However, the discontinuance of criminal conspiracy prose-
cutions hardly marked the end of legal limitations on the right
of laborers to organize. The conspiracy theory was scarcely
laid to rest as creating a criminal offense when it was reborn as
establishing civil liability in tort whenever either the means or
the end were, by a judge's subjective standard, unlawful. 6
This elusive but widely adhered to "end-means" test, explained
by Justice Holmes in a dissenting opinion in Vegelahn v.
Guntner,37 represented a more moderate and liberated view of
union activity, but one which still limited unions to the business
of improving the lot of their own members vis-a-vis their own
employers, rather than attempting to achieve broader social
goals. If unions were legal at all, it was simply because they
were collective parties to an ordinary commercial contract.
Collectivization was judicially-and later statutorily-endorsed
simply to prevent unconscionable terms imposed by a domi-
nant employer and to avoid any real foment among the histori-
cally abused working class.38 The opinion of Justice Holmes
makes that clear:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is
that between the effort of every man to get the most he
can for his services, and that of society, disguised under
the name of capital, to get his services for the least possi-
ble return. Combination on the one side is patent and
powerful. Combination on the other side is the necessary
34. Commonwealth v. Pullis, Philadelphia Mayors Court (1806);
COMMONS & GILMORE, supra note 30, at 140.
35. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, (1842), cited in
AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 273-74 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987).
36. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
37. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1079.
38. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAw (1985).
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and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on
in a fair and equal way. 9
This is hardly an exhaustive chronicle of American labor
history. It is sufficient to note that unions, even before Jimmy
Hoffa and J. Edgar Hoover, were warily, and often, hostilely
regarded by the legal system. Even after unions were effec-
tively legalized, they were made to tread jurisprudential
waters .40
It would require no particular omniscience to speculate
that American courts would be conservative in their
approach to the problems thrown up by unionism, even
after the atrophy of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy.
A judiciary nurtured in the culture of contract and prop-
erty, and recruited largely from the middle and upper
classes of society, would very naturally have moved
slowly in the adaptation of its legal system to accommo-
date and privilege the injuries to recognized interests
which collective action in its typical form necessarily
inflicts. It was to be anticipated that organized labor
would face an uphill struggle in gaining legal acceptance
of its normal modes of conduct in the absence of legisla-
tive approbation, and so it has been.4 1
For a long time, even congressional endorsement of col-
lective bargaining helped little to change how unions were
treated by either their employer counterparts or by judges.
The Clayton Act, passed in 1914,42 declared that the "labor of
a human being" was not "an article of commerce;" that anti-
39. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1077, 1081. I want to note that most
references, regardless of source, to the American worker, are to the male
worker. This is, and has been, only partially accurate. It may simply be
another sign that our language is not gender-neutral and it is difficult to
overcome the nearly universal past use of the male pronoun to refer to both
sexes. It may also be symptomatic of the troubles between women and
unions.
40. Federal courts often issued blanket injunctions. See, e.g., Toledo,
A.A. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1893);
FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
Collective bargaining contracts were unenforceable in court. See, e.g., JOHN R.
COMMONS &JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 118 (1920)
("The so-called 'contract' which a trade union makes with an employer or an
employer's association is merely a 'gentleman's agreement,' a mutual
understanding not enforceable against anybody."), quoted in Summers, supra
note 25, at 40 n.35.
41. LEROY MERRIFIELD ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 18 (1989).
42. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1988)).
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trust laws were inapplicable to unions in most cases; and, that
labor activity was virtually unenjoinable by federal judges. But
the statute was largely nullified by a reactionary judiciary, 43 and
the state courts, especially, were loathe to abandon their love
affair with the labor injunction, even after Congress passed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. 44 Under that law, Congress
hoped to crystallize its proscription of injunction by federal
courts of peaceful labor disputes, but state judges were still
reluctant to allow untrammelled collective action.45
In 1935, the first comprehensive federal labor statute was
passed-the Wagner Act 4 6 -which had as its avowed purposes
the encouragement of collective bargaining and the equaliza-
tion of bargaining power between employers and employees.47
This goal was, in part, achieved in the 1940s and 1950s. Now,
however, there appears to be more than a little backsliding to
the times when unions were officially and legally wrong. Per-
haps the legislative approbation was not clear enough, was too
avant garde for its times,48 or was not really meant to be given
a literal interpretation, but some commentators wonder if the
National Labor Relations Act has been silently repealed.49
43. See Walter E. Oberer, The Regulation of Union Economic Power, in
AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 270 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987).
44. 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1988)).
45. Stuart Linnick, Injunctions, in BASIC LABOR RELATIONS 92-94
(Bertrand B. Pogrebin & Selma Arnold eds., 1976).
46. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988)).
47. The purpose clause provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
48. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL, 1932-40, at 151-52 (1963):
The Wagner Act was one of the most drastic legislative innovations
of the decade. . . . No one, then or later, fully understood why
Congress passed so radical a law with so little opposition and by
such overwhelming margins. A bill which lacked the support of the
administration until the very end, and which could expect sturdy
conservative opposition, it moved through Congress with the
greatest of ease.
49. There is a plethora of writing, the predominant conclusion of which
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Judicial reactions to labor, at least in the past decade, seem
antithetical to the fostering of collectivization.5"
Accepting congressional articulation as a reliable source of
public policy and disapprobative of rewriting history, it appears
our legal system should afford unions at least neutrality, if not
advocacy. Despite the limited parameters of the California
decisions, the purport of the Wagner Act and all its ill-fated
predecessors seems ignored. Joining a union in a family law
case may impose upon it obligations it was not meant to-
indeed, could not-undertake. Every effort by unions to be
more political, and to be less concerned with increasing the size
of the paychecks of its members, has been halted by the Ameri-
can legal system-either its constabulary or its judiciary-since
the Knights of Labor struck for child labor laws and universal
public education in the 1870s.5 Judicial adoption of the end-
is that the Wagner Act, as amended and applied, has failed. See, e.g., Karl E.
Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective Bargaining Law:
A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731, 733 nn. 5-6 (1985).
50. Some argue that the Wagner Act was emasculated by the judiciary
almost as soon as it was passed. See, e.g., MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. NLRB,
304 U.S. 333 (1938) (employers can permanently replace employees who are
on strike thereby diminishing the union's collective strength); American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (employer can lock out
employees in order to strengthen its bargaining position); A.H. Raskin,
Elysium Lost: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 38 STAN. L. REV. 945 (1986); James B.
Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841 (1985). The
judicial disinclination toward unions diminished somewhat the two decades
after the NLRA was passed but appears to have heightened with a more
conservative judiciary-appointed, by and large, by Ronald Reagan, whose
pro-business/power philosophy was resoundingly supported by the free-
market law and economics scholars. See, e.g., Richard E. Epstein, A Common
Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J.
1357 (1983); see also Patternmakers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95
(1985) (union members can quit the union at any time, even during a strike
they voted to undertake, and the union cannot discipline them for quitting);
TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989) (union
members who quit the union and abandoned a strike need not be replaced at
the end of the strike by employees who did not abandon the strike but had
more seniority with the employer); Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 273
N.L.R.B. 1715 (1985) (general no-strike clause precludes a union from
engaging in a sympathy strike in solidarity with another local); First Nat'l
Maintenance v. NLRB 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (employers need not bargain over
changes in operations, even if they permanently displace workers represented
by the union, if the changes involve entrepreneurial decisions about issues
other than labor costs).
51. See, e.g., New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. General Longshore
Workers, 486 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1980) (union cannot lawfully strike in
opposition to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan); Peter J.
McGovern, The Children's Rights and Child Labor: Advocacy on Behalf ofthe Child
Worker, 28 S.D. L. REV. 293 (1983); see also Communications Workers v. Beck,
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means test for "legal" union activity, which decriminalized
combinations of workers, probably created the business-union-
ism52 that represents all but the smallest part of organized
labor activity in this country.53 Consequently, it is mystifying
to see state judges call upon unions to encourage their mem-
bers to pay child support.
B. Unions and the First Amendment
People join unions for reasons other than pay raises.54
They are often motivated by a desire to become a part of a
whole-more powerful than each alone-and by a need to
belong and associate.55
The urge to join a union ... came not only from expecta-
tion of economic gain through collective action. The
hope that he would attain greater security-a square deal
and protection from arbitrary discipline-was always
highly important, but there was also an often uncon-
scious desire on the part of the individual wage earner to
strengthen his feeling of individual worth and signifi-
487 U.S. 735 (1988) and its progeny, which severely limit the right of unions
to use collective funds for political advocacy--or for that matter, for any
purposes some judge finds not germane to collective bargaining. If the
Butchers or the Carpenters collectively decided that the California family
laws disserved their single parent members by encouraging non-payment of
child support, they could not take collective action that had an impact upon
their employer to make their protest. In fact, they could not even take an ad
in a newspaper to ask for legislative changes, without allowing their dues
payors to dissent and to refuse to contribute to the cost of the ad.
52. This term refers to the impliedly "legal" goals of the labor
movement which judges recognized in the latter part of the nineteenth and
early part of the twentieth century. A union can engage in collective action to
further its proper "business related goals," such as increased wages or better
working hours. It cannot strike to further more general social goals which
the collective has adopted. See, e.g., International Longshoremen Ass'n v.
Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (despite unions' claim that unloading
Soviet vessels to protest the invasion of Afghanistan was morally repugnant,
their refusal to deal was unlawful secondary boycott).
53. Oberer, supra note 43, at 271.
54. However, that is a critically important reason. In 1947, Professor
Clyde Summers, in addressing the rights of blacks, women, and other
"minorities" to challenge their exclusion from unions, wrote: "To exclude a
man from a club may be to deny him pleasant dinner companionship, but to
exclude a worker from a union may be to deny him the right to eat."
Summers, supra note 25, at 42.
55. There are many who would argue that people join unions because,
through the application of union security clauses, they are required to. Since
the opponents of organized labor are numerous and articulate, I feel no need
to express or discuss that point of view.
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cance in an industrialized society. Machinery was more
and more making the worker an automatic cog in a pro-
cess over which he had no influence or control. The
complete impersonality of corporate business, with man-
agement far removed from any direct contact with
employees, further accentuated this loss of individual sta-
tus. The wage earner could find a satisfaction in mem-
bership in such a meaningful social organization as a
labor union that was denied him as one of among many
thousands of depersonalized employees . . . . The
unions, often including some of the ritual of the fraternal
lodges, met a very real need entirely apart from the sup-
port they provided for collective bargaining.
56
With these additional reasons for association, governmen-
tal interference in union matters takes on constitutional dimen-
sions.5 ' Beyond that, governmental activity should not
discourage union membership, for fear of infringing upon
basic human rights. Despite our mythology of rugged individu-
alism, it is collectively that most human progress has been
made. The racist and sexist denial of membership in such col-
lectives to people of color or women 5 1 is reprehensible not
only because it is debasing and discriminatory, but also because
56. FOSTER R. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 205 (1949), quoted in GLEN
ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 186 (2d ed. 1961).
For the sake of preciseness, I quote the passage as it was written. But these
and other references to the worker as "he" fail to acknowledge the
participation of more than half of the workforce who are women.
57. See, e.g., the discussion in NOWAK ET AL., supra note 21, in which the
authors, with great lucidity, explain that the derivative first amendment
associational right has "three separate aspects": "economic associations"
which are least protected from state infringement; the associational right
"connected to the fundamental right to privacy" which requires "active
judicial review"; and the "right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
types of activity expressly protected by the first amendment," about which
the authors conclude: "[t]his right cannot be limited by the government
unless the limitation serves a compelling governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of ideas and this governmental interest cannot be furthered
through means which are significantly less restrictive of the associational or
expressive freedom." Id. at 948. Were I willing to adopt a more radical
approach, I would argue that the Wilion and Senecker orders are
unconstitutional, because unions are political, and because "the precise type
of associational right that is asserted in a case may not be easily categorized,
but the Court must consider the nature of the right in order to determine the
validity of governmental restrictions at issue." Id. at 948-49. See Lyng v.
International Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
469 U.S. 609 (1984); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
58. See, e.g., Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 426 U.S. 88 (1945); Steele v.
Louisville & Nat. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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membership is necessary for political, economic, and spiritual
empowerment. Arthur Schlesinger wrote:
At first thought it seems paradoxical that a country famed
for being individualistic should provide the world's great-
est example of joiners .... To Americans individualism
has meant, not the individual's independence of other
individuals, but his and their freedom from governmental
restraint. Traditionally, the people have tended to mini-
mize collective organization as represented by the state
while exercising the largest possible liberty in forming
their own voluntary organizations. This conception of a
political authority too weak to interfere with men's ordi-
nary pursuits actually created the necessity for self-con-
stituted associations to do things beyond the capacity of
single person, and by reverse effect the success of such
endeavors proved a continuing argument against the
growth of stronger government.
59
C. Unions' and Members' First Amendment Rights
Union members enjoy the right to freely associate as a
derivative freedom, concomitant to those enumerated in the
First Amendment.60 Unions have the same perquisites of citi-
zenship as any other group. As the Supreme Court explained
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,6 the right to engage in activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment implies a "correspond-
ing right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends."62 Without the right to have somebody on your side in
an unpopular movement, the freedom of speech is supernu-
merary.63 Intuitively, union membership engenders articula-
tion of beliefs and efficient efforts at seeking redress against the
59. Arthur Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation ofJoiners, 50 AM. HisT. REV.
1 (1944), quoted in ABERNATHY, supra note 56, at 239.
60. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
61. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
62. Id. at 622.
63. A neat analogue under the NLRA is the employer's right to conduct
polls. In several important cases, the Labor Board has been upheld in its
reasoning that, normally, employees ought not to be individually asked about
their union support, because it is much more difficult to speak individually
than in a group as to one's collective interests. See Hotel Employees &
Restaurant Employees Union v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985);
Struksnes Const. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967); Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1964); Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
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government, and most importantly, collective bargaining with a
stronger economic adversary-the employer with the capital.
The District Court of the District of Columbia64 noted that
"labor unions are labor organizations which exist for the pur-
pose, inter alia, of advancing the economic and political inter-
ests of their members." '65 These presumed collective interests
of unions endow them with First Amendment protection. They
have the right to speak collectively, and the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech and association extends to the protec-
tion of an individual's right to join a labor union.
One of the earliest Supreme Court statements of these
principles was in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,66
in which the Court struck down an ordinance which vested
uncontrolled discretion in city officials to permit or deny any
group the opportunity to conduct an assembly in a public
place. Justice Stone recognized the lawful and useful purpose
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations to disseminate
information about the National Labor Relations Act. Later, in
Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court concluded that the Constitution
protects "[flree discussion concerning the conditions in indus-
try and the causes of labor disputes [which] appears to us indis-
pensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of
popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial
society."
6 7
Although unions clearly had an associational interest, it
continued to be challenged by lower courts in decisions that
reflected the historic antipathy to unions. In Thomas v. Collins,6"
the international president of the United Autoworkers, who
was also the Vice-President of the Congress of Industrial Orga-
nizations, was arrested, tried, and convicted for violation of a
Texas statute that required all union organizers to get an
"organizer's card" from the Secretary of State prior to any
union membership solicitation. By a five to four margin, the
Supreme Court held that the law violated the constitutional
protection of free speech and assembly. It rejected the finding
of the state's highest court that the registration of union
organizers was required "for the protection of the general wel-
fare of the public, and particularly the laboring class." 69
64. International Union v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234 (D.C. 1986), rev'd
sub nom, 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
65. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. at 1235.
66. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
67. 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
68. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
69. Id. at 524. Note how the state's paternalism toward workers, like
1992]
470 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA , ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
Despite some continuing official efforts to curtail union
First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has conceded
them. For example, in United States v. Congress of Industrial Orga-
nizations,70 the government claimed that a union could not pub-
lish, in its own newspaper, editorials or articles favoring
specific candidates in a federal election without violating a law
which prohibited certain group political spending. The major-
ity of the Court did not determine the constitutionality of the
act, since it found "in the Senate debates definite indication
that Congress did not intend to include within the coverage of
the section as an expenditure the cost of the publication
described in the indictment."'7 ' However, four concurringJus-
tices explained why they would have found the act unconstitu-
tional, based upon their notions of the union's freedom of
assembly:
The expression of bloc sentiment is and always has been
an integral part of our democratic and electoral
processes. We could hardly go on without it. Moreover,
to an extent not necessary now to attempt delimiting,
that right is secured by the guarantee of freedom of
assembly, a liberty essentially coordinate with the free-
doms of speech, the press, and conscience .... There is
therefore, an effect in restricting expenditures for the
publicizing of political views not inherently present in
restricting other types of expenditure, namely that it nec-
essarily deprives the electorate, the persons entitled to
hear, as well as the author of the utterance, whether an
individual or a group, of the advantage of free and full
discussion and of the right of free and full assembly for
that purpose. The most complete exercise of those rights
is essential to the full, fair and untrammeled operation of
the electoral process. . . . To say that labor unions as
such have .. .no vital or legitimate interest in it is to
ignore the obvious facts of political and economic life
and of their increasing interrelationship in modern soci-
ety .... That ostrichlike conception, if enforced by law,
that toward women, more likely interferes with freedoms than guarantees
them. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (state statutory scheme
limiting the number of hours women can work each day is not offensive to
fourteenth amendment); see, e.g., Patricia Williams, Fetal Fictions: An
Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial and Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV.
81 (1990); Mary E. Becker, From Mueller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219 (1986).
70. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
71. Id. at 116.
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would deny those values both to unions and thus to that
extent to their members, as also to the voting public in
general.72
This historic right to associate, both for mutual aid and
protection and for the purpose of influencing the course of
political events, was not easily won.7' This difficulty is not sur-
prising, since the legality of the very existence of unions-the
right of workers to organize-was so belatedly recognized.
The fact of association, the Court finally realized, meant that
speech/action also had to be protected. But we are still strug-
gling with the concept of unions as speakers.
Many people, including a few Supreme Court justices, are
not entirely convinced that a union should not be considered,
first and foremost, a political animal." Justice Black dissented
in International Association of Machinists v. Street,75 wherein the
72. Id. at 143-44; cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958):
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association, as this Court has more than once recognized by
remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech
and assembly .... Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic,
religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the
effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny.
73. ABERNATHY, supra note 56, at 190-91.
74. It is not merely an accident of violent or peaceful change of social
order in a country that unions are always dismantled. Witness Poland, the
Sudan, and the host of other nations where changes are quickly being
wrought and worker collectives are under siege. See also Beck v.
Communications Workers of Am., 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (invalidating collection of dues for political
purposes of unions, but affirmed their use for collective bargaining. In a
concurrence, Justice Stevens wrote: "Nor is there any basis here for
distinguishing 'collective-bargaining activities' from 'political activities' so far
as the interests protected by the first amendment are concerned. Collective
bargaining in the public sector is 'political' in any meaningful sense of the
word.... Decisions reached through collective bargaining in the schools will
affect not only the teachers and quality of education, but also the taxpayers
and the beneficiaries of other important public services."); Board of Educ. v.
Chicago Teachers Union, 412 N.E.2d 587 (1980). There may be no real
difference between public and private sector bargaining in a macroeconomic
sense. Large pay raises in the auto industry may lead to weakened import
tariffs, steel subsidies, or any number of political solutions. Conversely,
campaigning for candidates who oppose right-to-work legislation, or federal
statutes like the Food Stamp Amendments, which disqualify strikers and their
households from benefits, certainly affect the relative bargaining power of the
union as an economic player.
75. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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Court held that the Railway Labor Act was not intended to
authorize political expenditures by a union of any dissenters'
dues money, especially where there was a union security agree-
ment which forced all employees to pay union dues.76 He con-
cluded that "[ulnions composed of voluntary members, like all
other voluntary groups, should be free in this country to fight
in the public forum to advance their own causes, to promote
their choice of candidates and parties and to work for the doc-
trines or the laws they favor." 77 It is clear that in the current
political environment unions espouse beliefs that probably are
considered dissident, since the political party in the White
House tends to espouse a free market theory, laissez-faire, and
protection of capital. 78 Any claimed associational rights of the
delinquent fathers in Wilson and Senecker must have some nexus
to collective speech-however, that speech need not be directly
political.
Arguably, the instant cases do not present facts which
would suggest a need for protection of constitutional rights. In
both Wilson and Senecker, the state was aware of the delinquent's
membership in the union. Its subsequent demand for employ-
ment information was, therefore, less intrusive than if the state
had merely asked the union if the delinquents were members,
because a state's demand for release of membership lists has
always caused courts particular concern. A worker cannot be
deterred from joining a group with lawful ends because mem-
bership would carry with it the possibility that other constitu-
tional rights would be abridged. Where membership in an
organization would subject someone to censure within her
76. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the dissent, which
sidestepped the issue of whether the Railway Labor Act was constitutional,
and merely construed the Act as imputing these limits on union spending to
advance their majority political positions. Before ascending to the Court,
Frankfurter was an unqualified champion of collective bargaining and the
rights of unions. In Machinists, and other cases, he disappointed many
considered pro-labor by a rigid obeisance to his own notions of separation of
powers and his belief that political, not judicial, resolutions of important
labor issues were preferable. His distrust of the judiciary led to his frequent
conclusions that the Court should avoid declaring acts of Congress void. See,
e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Frankfurter, Labor Law and the Judge's Function, 67 YALE
L.J. 266 (1957).
77. Street, 367 U.S. at 796.
78. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 50. I would not call Professor Epstein a
member of the "ruling hierarchy;" however much of the political thought he
espouses has been typified by the members of the President's party in this
country for the past decade. The President's initial vetoes of the amended
civil rights bill and the extension of unemployment benefits bill demonstrates
some of that philosophy.
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community, the Court has demanded sufficient grounds for
release of that membership information. In fact, freedom of
association as a concept grew out of a series of cases in the
1950s and 1960s in which states were attempting to get group
membership information in order to curb the groups' activities.
In the first case, NAACP v. Alabama,79 the Court unani-
mously set aside a contempt citation imposed after the organi-
zation refused to comply with a court order to produce a list of
its members within the state. The Court decided that Alabama
had failed to demonstrate a need for NAACP membership lists
which would outweigh the harm to associational rights that dis-
closure would produce.80 The Court adhered to this conclu-
sion in a later NAACP case, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 8 ' because,
[t]here was substantial uncontroverted evidence that
public identification of persons in the community as
members of the organizations had been followed by har-
assment and threats of bodily harm. There was also evi-
dence that fear of community hostility and economic
reprisals that would follow public disclosure of the mem-
bership lists had discouraged new members from joining
the organizations and induced former members to
withdraw.
8 2
Certainly, the magnitude of harm and fear of a black or
white member of the NAACP during the tumultuous sixties
cannot be compared to the threat presented by the Wilson
orders. But the similarities are not so discrete as to be of no
moment. Messieurs Wilson and Senecker did not join their
unions to avoid paying child support. They could have done
that as easily by not collectivizing or, even better, by not work-
79. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
80. The Supreme Court distinguished New York v. Zimmerman, 278
U.S. 63 (1928), in which the Court validated a New York law requiring any
organization which "prescribes secret oaths as a condition of membership" to
file its membership lists with the Secretary of State. The law was directed
against the Ku Klux Klan, and specifically exempted labor unions, Masons,
Oddfellows, and the Knights of Columbus-all relatively benign groups. The
law in Zimmerman was an attempt to control a group's criminal activities,
rather than an effort to decimate collective protest against heinous social
wrongs. The Court did not explain why Klanners did not share the
protection later granted to members of the, NAACP; the Court did, however,
note that one's primary and associational rights were not protected against
lawful inquiry into unlawful activities. Zimmerman could, arguably, support
either a protected claim of the defendant unions or the lawful intrusion by
the State of California.
81. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
82. Id. at 523-24.
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ing. The threats to their right to belong suggests that the
domestic orders against their unions fly in the face of this lately
won but integral freedom. The associational rights of unions,
and other groups, are subject to limitation which are necessi-
tated by other, pressing societal needs. The gravamen of the
argument is, however, the necessity. When more conventional
and less intrusive methods of collecting child support are avail-
able, why should the specter of invasion into personal liberties
be ignored?
3
In several cases where a union was treated exactly like
other groups-which is not the case in Wilson and Senecker-and
where there was no apparent reason why holding a union to the
same standard would be harmful, state limitations were
approved. For example, provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act requiring the reporting and disclosure of contri-
butions and expenditures to and by unions, (which, in this con-
text at least, were identified as political organizations) were
sustained in Buckley v. Valeo. 84
However, an Ohio law that replicated the FEC Act was
found to violate the First Amendment in Brown v. Socialist Work-
ers Party.85 The Court examined the threat to a minor political
party like SWP, and found that "even a small risk of harass-
ment '8 6 could seriously interfere with the SWP's freedom and
ability to disseminate ideas and solicit "support for an unpopu-
lar cause."' s7 The most recent data suggests that labor unions
are regarded by the American public with great suspicion. 8
One may conjecture as to the reasons therefor, which may
include a healthy disrespect for organizations that are corrupt
and unresponsive to the membership. Conversely, the animus
may stem from a real fear that association with unions-
deemed unpopular by the government, as evidenced by Presi-
dent Reagan's discharge of thousands of air traffic controllers
83. As one writer has observed: "In view of the importance of the right
of association, it is suggested that the governmental requirement of
disclosure of membership be looked on as a last resort measure, to be used
only when laws punishing overt unlawful acts, honestly enforced, fail to
afford the necessary protection." ABERNATHY, supra note 56, at 228.
84. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
85. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
86. Id. at 98.
87. Id. at 97.
88. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE PUBLIC'S CRITIQUE OF
CONGRESS 82 (Jan.-Feb. 1991); Charles Craver, The Current and Future Status of
Labor Organizations, 36 LABOR L.J. 210 (1985); LaLonde & Meltzer, supra note
3, at 953-56.
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in 1980,89 by a rash of decisions by the administration-con-
trolled NLRB, and by affirmations of the need to diminish the
authority of labor unions by the Supreme Court 9°-can only
hurt workers. The debate about the efficacy of collectivization
and the appropriate (if any) role of unions in making the econ-
omy and the country work will always be with us. Whether one
reads the trade journals of the National Association of Manu-
facturers, the law and economics adherents, or the Solidarity
1 89. United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 504 F.
Supp. 432 (N.D. Il. 1980), opinion supplemented by United States v. Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Org., 504 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1980), opinion
supplemented by United States v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers 504 F.
Supp. 442 (N.D. Ill. 1980), order rev'd United States v. Professional Air Traffic
Controllers 653 F. 2d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Professional Air Traffic
Controllers v. United States, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
90. See, e.g., TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S.
426 (1989). The majority approved a position of the airline that it could
recruit striking employees with less seniority to return to work to replace
more senior flight attendants. Once they came back to work, they were
entitled to keep that particular position-even though the employees they
replaced had had to work years to get those more desirable duty stations, for
example, Los Angeles rather than Topeka. Justice Brennan dissented:
The employer's promise to members of the bargaining unit that
they will not be displaced at the end of a strike if they cross the
picket lines addresses a far different incentive to the bargaining-unit
members than does the employer's promise of permanence to new
hires. The employer's threat to hire permanent replacements from
outside the existing work force puts pressure on the strikers as a
group to abandon the strike before their positions are filled by others.
But the employer's promise to members of the striking bargaining
unit that if they abandon the strike (or refuse to join it at the outset)
they will retain their jobs at strike's end in preference to more senior
workers who remain on strike produces an additional dynamic: now
there is also an incentive for individual workers to seek to save (or
improve) their own positions at the expense of other members of the
striking bargaining unit. We have previously observed that offers of
"individual benefits to the strikers . . . to induce them to abandon
the strike ... could be expected to undermine the strikers' mutual
interest and place the entire strike effort in jeopardy."
Id. at 448-49 (citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 230-31
(1963)) (emphasis in original).
If the employer is prohibited from discriminating among members of the
bargaining unit on the basis of strike activity in allocating post-strike jobs,
then the employer should not promise certain bargaining-unit members that
the jobs will be theirs permanently, merely because those members returned
to work during the strike. See NLRB v. Eric Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221
(1963); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 33 (1938). Some observ-
ers believe that TWA comports with those decisions entered shortly after the
NLRA was passed, which quickly emasculated the newly-empowered workers.
Others feel that TWA has been the latest, and most devastating, in a series of
anti-union decisions.
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Forever newsletter, the issue is unresolvable through empirical
proof. However, if we accept Justice Blackmun's characteriza-
tion, "[h]aving determined that the individual worker standing
alone lacked sufficient bargaining power to achieve a fair settle-
ment with his employer over the terms and conditions of
employment, Congress passed the NLRA in order to protect
employees' rights to join together and act collectively ... "91 as
accurate, there is a national commitment to collective bargain-
ing. It is, however, a cause that can be characterized as unpop-
ular, and whose supporters and spokespersons are likely to
engender more than a "small risk of harassment."92
Certainly, however, when the disclosure becomes more
individualized, as to this particular delinquent father who has
had his due process and who has been adjudged delinquent
and in violation of both a support agreement and state law, it
may be that there is no associational right whatsoever. In light
of his illegal conduct, it is arguable that he has very few
rights.93 Disclosure of a membership list or even the name of a
single member might violate a group's freedom of association
but certainly under circumstances quite different from those
present in the cases of fathers who are delinquent in their child
support payments. The Supreme Court has never recognized a
privacy right to commit a crime. In Hotel and Restaurant Employ-
91. Patternmakers League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 118 (1985)
(Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
92. Brown v. Socialist Workers Party, 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982).
93. There is an interesting analogue to questions in administrative law
where retroactivity, which ordinarily might bar agency action, is forgiven in
certain situations where the agencies' retroactive application of a new rule
would serve only to expand the class of persons who are precluded from
committing a civilly illegal act. See, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355
F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966) ("[a]lthough courts have not generally balked at
allowing administrative agencies to apply a rule newly fashioned in an
adjudicative proceeding to past conduct, a decision branding as 'unfair'
conduct stamped 'fair' at the time the party acted, raises judicial hackles
considerably more than a determination that merely brings within the
agency's jurisdiction an employer recently left without .... or shortens the
period in which a collective bargaining agreement may bar a new election ....
or imposes a more severe remedy for conduct already prohibited .. ");
Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (where the NLRB adopted a rule that its previous adjudications
holding a contract of five years in length as a bar to any representational
action was invalid and that, it was more appropriate for the contract to be no
longer than three years. The court upheld the action of the agency saying
that (a) there was no proof that the retroactive application of the new contract
bar rule worked a hardship upon the union; (b) periodic adjustments in the
contract bar rules are necessary to achieve the statutory objective; and (c) any
other rule would create an administrative monstrosity.).
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ees and Bartenders International Union v. Read,94 the Third Circuit
conceded: "We begin with the assumption that the union qua
union has certain rights that are protected by the first amend-
ment. As a broad proposition, the first amendment protects
non-political as well as political activity .... Additionally, some
union activity presumably comes within the right to associate
for expressive purposes. 95 ' However, the court found that
New Jersey's Casino Control Act, which required all unions
representing casino workers to tell the state who their officers
were, and which mandated that any "career offender or a mem-
ber of a career offender cartel"-a euphemism likely capable of
legal definition-could not hold office in a casino union,
"imposed no burden on Local 54's right of free association."
96
The union could disseminate ideas; it simply could not let pro-
fessional criminals hold office.9 7
The non-supporting fathers whose unions are now being
asked to turn them into the state are not literally being denied
the opportunity to freely associate or to disseminate ideas.98
We cannot know whether either of these delinquent fathers is
political. The unions to which they belong, however, have that
potential-which will more likely be realized by having as large
a membership as possible. As one court described it, "the
prima facie case for an arguable first amendment claim"
requires "a factual showing of harassment, membership with-
drawal or discouragement of new members, or other conse-
quences which objectively suggest an impact (or 'chilling') on
the members' associational rights." 99 And some people, even
those without support obligations, may object to belonging to a
group that is subject to an order that could be characterized as
requiring them to conspire against their members. If they do,
is that not some proof of impact upon the rights of unions to
exercise their First Amendment freedoms? The Supreme
Court has made the point that: "[T]he right to associate does
not lose all constitutional protection merely because some
members of the group may have participated in conduct or
94. 832 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1987).
95. Id. at 265 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 266; cf. Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 468 U.S.
491 (1984) (the Casino Control Act was not preempted by national labor
law).
97. Cf. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (invalidation of city
ordinance which gave mayor and city council complete discretion to grant a
permit for solicitation of group members, including union members, as prior
restraint infringement of first amendment freedom of speech).
98. In fact, non-support of children may be a crime.
99. O'Neal v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 874, 878 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
19921
478 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
advocated doctrine that is itself not protected." 0 People have
the right to freely associate for common political and economic
purposes, even if the association includes disreputes and
deadbeats who fail and refuse to support their own children.
Any lawful objective of the union is protected, keeping in
mind the historic parameters precluding truly pro-active polit-
ical movement by a union. For example, the Court recognized
that, like "political" organizations such as the NAACP, unions
have the right to use lawyers to organize their members to
assert their legal rights. In United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar
Ass'n,' 0 ' an Illinois court held that the union's employment of
an attorney on a salary basis to represent any of its members
who wished his services to prosecute a worker's compensation
claim before the Illinois Industrial Commission constituted the
unauthorized practice of law.
The Supreme Court reversed, relying on NAACP v. But-
ton, 10 2 an earlier case in which the Court decided that bar
associations may not, under the guise of preventing "common-
law barratry, maintenance and champerty"' 0' prohibit lawyers
from serving as the legal spokespersons for NAACP members
who join together for the purpose of "vindicating legal inter-
ests."'0 4 In Button, the Court found that a Virginia law which
banned the improper solicitation of any legal or professional
business did not apply to the NAACP's practice of employing
staff attorneys to furnish legal services to people who were will-
ing to sue in an effort to challenge-and stop-Virginia's tradi-
tion of tolerating and legalizing racial segregation. The Court
saw nothing amiss in the NAACP's practice of hiring lawyers to
speak to groups and encourage their members to seek legal
redress for racial wrongs. Procuring these lawyers was simply
one way to pursue common and legal objectives.
The United Mine Workers Court rejected Illinois' contention
that Button was not controlling because Button was concerned
chiefly with litigation that could be characterized as a form of
political expression. Justice Black wrote: "The litigation in
question is, of course, not bound up with political matters of
acute social moment, as in Button, but the First Amendment
does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can
be characterized as political."' 0 5 He concluded that the state
100. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982).
101. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
102. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
103. Id. at 438.
104. Id. at 437.
105. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223.
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST
court's decree "thus substantially impairs the associational
rights of the Mine Workers and is not needed to protect the
State's interest in high standards of legal ethics."' 6
Both Wilson and Senecker have an association with their
union that could serve some purpose other than job referral.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 0 7 the Court observed that:
"[D]etermining the limits of state authority over an individual's
freedom to enter into a particular association ... unavoidably
entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objec-
tive characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most inti-
mate to the most attenuated of personal attachments.' 0 The
Court continued: "[c]ertain kinds of personal bonds have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation
by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they
thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the
individual and the power of the State." ' 9 Although the Court
made direct reference to "traditional" privacy cases-those
devolving around family decisions,"11 the relationship Wilson
and Senecker have with their unions may be of a type deserving
protection from state scrutiny-except in rare and extreme
cases.
One district court found that a union members' privacy
was violated by a law which made strikers and their families
ineligible to receive food stamps during the course of the
strike. In International Union v. Lyng, the court wrote:
The disputed limitation on food stamps for strikers inter-
feres or threatens to interfere with the First Amendment
right of the individual plaintiffs to associate with their
families .... and with fellow union members, . . . as well
as the reciprocal First Amendment right of each union
plaintiff to its members' association with the union. It
may be that a striker would not live apart from close fam-
ily members in order to provide them with food stamps.
106. Id. at 225; accord United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401
U.S. 576 (1971) (state court could not enjoin union from recommending to
their members lawyers who had agreed with the union to a set fee in
representing injured employees in claims against the government);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (first
amendment guarantees the right of a union to recommend that their injured
members seek the advice of union-selected lawyers throughout the country
regarding workers compensation claims).
107. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
108. Id. at 620.
109. Id. at 618-19 (citing family/privacy cases).
110. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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But as defendant has bluntly stated, the striker has, as an
alternative to leaving his family, the further options of
quitting his job or returning to work. Pursuit of either of
these alternatives would obviously sever or at least
threaten his association with his union and his fellow
union members. I
However, the Supreme Court found no substantial interference
with fundamental privacy rights, reasoning that the striker
could voluntarily end her temporary disqualification." 2 The
Court conceded that a strike might be the embodiment of cer-
tain First Amendment rights of free association and expression,
but that "does not require the Government to furnish funds to
maximize the exercise of that right." ''
The Supreme Court was not willing to use federal welfare
money to subsidize collective activity. Such a conclusion was
not surprising considering the political climate in which the
decision was reached. However, the district court's analysis of
the elements of the relationship between a union and its mem-
bers is coherent and convincing-and the rejection of that
111. 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (D.D.C. 1986); cf. Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635, 643-47 (1986) (Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's
conclusion that the government's presumption-that parents, children and
siblings who lived together were a single household for purposes of food
stamp eligibility, whereas nonrelated cohabitors were presumed not to be a
single household-did not violate equal protection).
112. The constitution protects collective action as a form of speech, but
both the method and the content of that speech are subject to limitations. See
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354
U.S. 284 (1957).
113. Lyng v. International Union 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988). In Ohio
Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), the Court
rejected the union petitioner's claim that he was denied equal protection by a
state law that disqualified strikers from receiving unemployment
compensation during a strike. The Court chose not to deal with the question
of disparate treatment of union employees, and merely approved the state's
distinctions in preserving the limited amount of money in the unemployment
fund. The Court arguably failed to recognize the myriad motivations for
union membership. It is an interesting possibility that both Hodory and Lyng
were wrongly decided in that they appear to ignore important Supreme Court
precedent that developed around a so-called "entitlement theory." In a long
line of cases, the Court decided that a state must have real justifications for
depriving persons of government entitlement without affording the persons
about to lose those benefits with due process. See, e.g., Railroad Retirement
Benefits Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) ("windfall" benefits for some
employees but not others are not violative of constitution); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student's temporary suspension from school requires
due process safeguards); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(pretermination hearing required before benefits previously granted can be
terminated).
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anaylysis by the Supreme Court is not persuasive that there is a
connection between being hungry and exercising the right to
strike. "'
Perhaps an important relationship like a workers union will
some day be recognized as being eligible for constitutional pro-
tection within the conceptual right to privacy, a right which
emanates from the First Amendment. But even without new
forays into the recognition of personal rights, it is theoretically
possible that the California court's demands upon these two
unions interfere with the privacy of individual members as well
as that of the union itself. Membership in a union is an impor-
tant relationship, for reasons that include mutuality of political
and economic goals, as well as the establishment of personal
associations. The Teamsters International Union may be the
kind of "large and basically unselective group[]" that the Court
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees found unworthy of protection
from the requirements of a state law that membership not be
denied on the basis of sex.1 15 However, the local union hiring
hall may be more like the type of association the Court would
protect. The Court noted: "[T]he constitutional shelter
offered such relationships reflects the realization that individu-
als draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted
state interference therefore safeguards the ability indepen-
dently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of
liberty."' 16
Senecker and Wilson involve men whose marriages and fami-
lies have fallen apart. They are neither seditionists nor gang-
sters. Their cohorts at the union hall may know their domestic
problems, and may provide succor and support." 7 Their situa-
114. The Supreme Court, simply by virtue of being supreme, is not
necessarily infallible. To many minds, the Court was unforgivably tardy in
discrediting laws that prevented interracial marriage (Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to choose one's spouse requires invalidation of
Virginia's miscegenation laws)) and laws that prevented a grandmother and
her grandsons from constituting a "single family" for zoning purposes
(Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)) because the
constitution from which the Court finally drew these conclusions was two
centuries old.
115. 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984). Of course, unions are already subject to
civil rights laws, so Roberts is factually distinct on this ground.
116. Id. at 619.
117. I would rather see that succor and support forthcoming when the
delinquents tell their fellows at the hall that they will be thrown in jail if they
continue to fail to support their children.
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tions are qualitatively different than those in which associa-
tional rights were found to be justly limited.
In the instant case, the state is concerned with needy chil-
dren. But that object alone should not justify radically different
treatment of unions in child support collection cases. The very
same motive-increasing the percentage of noncustodial par-
ents who pay child support-was not constitutionally adequate
for a state law that restricted the right of delinquent supporters
to marry. In Zablocki v. Redhail,I t the Supreme Court invali-
dated a state law that precluded the issuance of a marriage
license "[u]nless the marriage applicant submits proof of com-
pliance with the support obligation and, in addition, demon-
strates that the children covered by the support order are not
then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges."
1 9
Harkening to its earliest family/privacy decisions, the Court
found significant interference with fundamental interests.
Important as it is for a state to find ways to make financially
competent parents support their dependent children, it is
incumbent upon the state to do it in ways that do not abridge
other significant rights. In addition, the Court was bothered by
the ineffectiveness of the statute in achieving its salutary ends:
First, with respect to individuals who are unable to meet
the statutory requirements, the statute merely prevents
the applicant from getting married without delivering any
money at all into the hands of the applicant's prior chil-
dren. More importantly, regardless of the applicant's
ability or willingness to meet the statutory requirements,
the State already has numerous other means for exacting
compliance with support obligations, means that are at
least as effective as the instant statute and yet do not
impinge upon the right to marry.' 20
Maybe Mr. Wilson and Mr. Senecker, neither of whom was
indigent and both of whom filed income tax returns that put
them solidly within the "middle class,"' 2 1 could have asked
their new wives for the money. Perhaps they owned property
that could have been subject to a lien; they may have been
118. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
119. Id. at 375.
120. Id. at 390 n.16. The Court lists among those alternatives: wage
assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties.
121. Telephone conversation with Josanna Berkow, Assistant Attorney
General for the State of California, September 25, 1989. Brief for the
respondent, Senecker v. Senecker and Butchers Union Local No. 532 page 3
II A042450, 3, (1989), identifying Mr. Senecker's earnings for 1984 and
1986 based on his federal income tax.
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threatened with jail if they did not pay. One may conjecture
that a way would be found. Their unions need not have been
subject to disparate treatment that threatens to interfere with
their constitutional rights. 1
22
III. DELINQUENT FATHERS ARE A SOCIETAL PROBLEM OF
ENORMOUS PROPORTION
Arguments against imposing additional obligations upon
already burdened and weakened labor unions, against treating
fathers in unions differently than fathers who are lawyers or
businessmen, does not mean that strident, fair collection
efforts are not absolutely necessary. The problems, both socio-
logical and economic, presented by the non-payment of child
support, are enormous. If they are not already there, divorced
women and their children are often thrust into the lowest eco-
nomic tiers of society, a phenomenon denominated the "femi-
nization of poverty."' 125 Women have always been poorer than
men-especially after leaving a marriage. 124 A brief retrospec-
tive makes clear why this impoverishment is so predictable.
A. Historical Hierarchies
Even without regard to marital state, females do not fare
well. This emanates most likely from the earliest male rumina-
122. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & KELLY D. WEISBERG, CHILD,
FAMILY AND STATE 235 (1989).
123. See, e.g., Gladys Kessler, Crisis in Child Support: New Federal
Legislation to Alleviate the Problem, 20 TRIAL 28 (1984); see also OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
SUMMARIES OF REPORTS BY STATE COMMISSION ON CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT 51 (1986) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT] (Typical
were reports like that from the state of Illinois, that "nonpayment of child
support is the single largest factor in the rising feminization of poverty.");
KEN AULETrA, THE UNDERCLASS 68-79 (1983) (between 1970-77 "the number
of poor families headed by men declined by 25% . . . [but] the number of
women who headed households below the poverty line jumped by 7 10,000 or
38.7%"); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce:
The Influence of Custody on Support Levels & Payments, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319 (1988).
124. An interesting historical aside is that most women eschewed
divorce precisely because they could not afford to leave their men. Even a
bad husband is preferable to destitution. One study showed that "prior to
the Civil War the seeking of a divorce had been, with very few exceptions, the
exclusive province of men" (who almost always alleged their wives' adultery
as grounds), but more women began to get their own divorces in those states
"where it was hypothetically easiest for them to earn a living." MARY
SOMMERVILE JONES, AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CHANGING DIVORCE LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (1987) (citing CARROLL WRIGHT, A REPORT ON
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1867-86 (1891)).
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tions on 'natural' order, with men assuming a social, political,
and economic role superior to women.' 2 5 No less dubious nor
more relied upon a legal source than the Christian bible estab-
lished that women, as measured against a male supreme being,
were inferior.' 2 6 However, some women have surmised that
the inferiority was not deigned by nature but was instead cre-
ated and reiterated by the currently dominant group. Nine-
teenth century feminist Lucretia Mott said that the control of
wives by husbands was not apostolic but was "done by law and
public opinion."' 12 7 Whether women shared this belief, their
subjugation is part of what for centuries had been considered
natural law. Women's inferior position was legitimated directly
by men's claims that their God ordained them to be that
way.' 28 More than two hundred years ago, William Blackstone
summarized:
[T]he three great relations in private life are.... 1. That
of master and servant, which is founded in convenience,
whereby a man is directed to call in the assistance of
others, where his own skill and labor will not be sufficient
to answer the cares incumbent upon him.129 2. That of
125. For an interesting discussion of the origins of the cultural
ideology of female subordination, see Ricki Tannen, Setting the Agenda for the
1990's: The Historical Foundations of Gender Bias in the Law: A Context for
Reconstruction, 42 FLA. L. REV. 163 (1990).
126. See e.g., 1 Corinthians 11:3-11:16; 1 Timothy 2:8-2:15.
127. Lucretia Mott, Not Christianity but Capriestcraft, in FEMINISM: THE
ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRITINGS 76, 101 (Miriam Schneir ed., 1972).
128. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 11:3-11:16; 1 Timothy 2:8-2:15.
129. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
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husband and wife; . .3o [and 3.] that of parent and
child. '
3 '
This immutable hierarchy continues; many argue it is actually
reinforced by the common and statutory law of 'domestic rela-
tions.' Intervention by the state into family relationships,
although ostensibly to promote equality and to foster other
social goals such as guaranteed care of the children, may actu-
ally reinforce a hierarchy that was in existence at the time of the
feudal system,' 3 2 and before.
130. Id.
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is,
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she
performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-french afeme-
vocert; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence
of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of an union of
person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights,
duties and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage. I
speak not at present of the rights of property, but of such as are
merely personal. For this reason, a man cannot grant any thing to his
wife, or enter into covenant with her: for the grant would be to
suppose her separate existence; and to covenant with her, would be
only to covenant with himself: and therefore it is also generally true,
that all compacts made between husband and wife, when single, are
voided by the marriage.
Id.; cf. Mary E. Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage Labor Market and the
Need for Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel & Lagar, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934
(1986) (All working people need a "wife" to make achieving the most effi-
cient and highest paid labor possible for every working person).
131. BLACKSTONE, supra note 129, at *410. Blackstone's perceptions
have not been eschewed, despite protestations that we are more egalitarian.
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 205 (1979).
Blackstone's law of persons contained only relations of formal
inequality, such as king and subject, noble and commoner, pastor
and parishioner, husband and wife, master and servant. His
structure suggested that the human universe could be divided into
two parts: a world of hierarchically ordered relations of people to
one another, and an egalitarian world in which people dominated
objects. The function of this odd procedure was to legitimate the
status quo.
Id. at 350. Kennedy argues that little has changed.
132. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and The Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
During the feudal period, individuals were not expected to be equal.
Hierarchy was part of the natural order of things, paying homage to
God. Even if an individual might properly change... position in the
existing hierarchy, to try to alter the hierarchy itself would be
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Until the middle of the nineteenth century, men had juridi-
cal power over women, based upon laws that established a hus-
band's authority over his wife. Before that time in history,
upon marriage, the wife became a legal nonperson, living
under her husband's protection and cover. Beginning around
1850, and extending well into the twentieth century, depend-
ing upon the particular jurisdiction, laws denominated "mar-
ried women's acts" reclaimed for women the legal rights and
powers they automatically lost when they married, such as the
right to hold property, enter contracts, and bring lawsuits, per-
haps most importantly, against their own husbands.
33
Although removing some legal disabilities, these laws
hardly empowered women to either assume economic parity
with men, or even to force men to support their children.
Access to the courts and the marketplace have little intrinsic
worth; the actors-herein females-must have some other indi-
cia of power, which, to date, is lacking. According to Frances
Olsen:
The results of such reforms have often proved detrimen-
tal to women. Although the reforms promote equality
they also undermine the altruistic bases of the family and
thus leave women open to the kind of individualized par-
ticularized domination characteristic of market relations.
The reforms have tended to give women equal rights, but
they have not democratized the family.
The basis for the father's authority changed from
juridical superiority to other forms of power, such as
financial control and physical force, but the authority
nonetheless continued. The mother might no longer be
powerless simply because she was a wife, but she might
well remain powerless for reasons that would seem more
particular to her situation.'
3 4
It was, of course, not until nearly the last quarter of the
twentieth century that politicians decided that problems of sex-
ual inequality had to be directly addressed legislatively.' 3 5
Much in the same way Congress attempted to legitimate and
disgraceful. Everyone was considered to have an interest in keeping
inferiors and superiors in their place.
Id. at 1513-14.
133. See, e.g., Tresher v. McElroy, 106 So. 79 (Fla. 1925); Sybil M.
Jones, The Problem of Family Support: Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement of
Support, 38 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (1959).
134. Olsen, supra note 132, at 1532.
135. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),
(h) (1988).
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fortify employee collectivization, and protect labor unions from
the societal and judicial animosity that was later recognized as
also directed against women,1 3 6 it passed laws prohibiting judi-
cially-approved workplace discrimination based on gender. An
evaluation of the success of sex-discrimination laws is beyond
the purview of this article, but there is hardly a universal claim
of its success, and women, for reasons that likely include both
willful discrimination and inherent social distinctions, have
lesser earning power and access to employment opportunity. 13
7
B. Women's Economic Disadvantages
While no one would claim that the law was responsible for
the traditional division of labor in the family, it did serve to
sanction and reinforce family relationships which disserved the
economic weal of the female except as a dependent.' There
136. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953)
(employer and union allowed to negotiate "seniority credit" for those who
served in WWII, even though they had not been employed by Ford prior to
military service, with women consequently being fired and replaced by men);
Hartley v. Railway Clerks, 277 N.W. 885 (1938) (employer could fire all
married women, thus protecting the jobs of less senior male employees who
were "heads of households").
137. See, e.g., ELLEN F. PAUL, EQUALITY & GENDER: THE COMPARABLE
WORTH DEBATE (1989); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
NATIONAL DATA BOOK AND GUIDE TO SOURCES, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS 406, MEDIAN
INCOME OF YEAR-ROUND FULL TIME WORKERS 449, MONEY INCOME OF
PERSONS 449 (109th ed. 1989). (In 1987, women earned an average of
$17,504 to men's $26,722, with white women earning $2,000 more per year
than African-American or Hispanic women. In 1987 white males earned
almost $50.00 more per week than white females. There is even a
measurable difference in the wages of men and women when they are
performing similar types of work. In 1987, managerial and professional men
earned $33,072 annually compared to managerial and professional women's
earned income of $22,932 annually (extracted from table). Men in technical
sales and administrative support positions earned $23,556 to women's
$15,236 annually (figures extracted from table). Male machine operators,
fabricators and laborers earned $17,888 to female's $11,812 annually (figures
extrapolated from table). Even in such diverse and unique areas as forestry
and farming, there is a discrepancy in the annual wages, with men earning
$11,588 to women's $9,932. African-American women have the lowest
average earned income of any workers in the United States); see also Austin,
supra note 10, at 561 n.99, and articles cited therein (young black mothers
have special difficulties including less education, less work experience, and
more difficulty securing child care and child support).
138. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
[Liaw's influence worked through prescriptions and proscriptions,
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is implicit bias against working mothers because of their neces-
sary obligations to their husbands and children."3 9 It is inter-
esting to note that some researchers argue that "employers
might unjustifiably regard marital status as a proxy for commit-
ment to work, indicating employment instability in the case of
married women but stability in the case of married men."' 40 In
the context of divorce and child support actions, it is more
likely that mothers have additional burdens upon their ability
to earn money.' 4 1 They may have been absent from the work
force for long periods of time devoted exclusively to child-
bearing and raising. 142 Beyond that, employers often resist
providing the flexibility required to accommodate working
mothers, and therefore either refuse to hire them; relegate
them to less responsible (and lower-paying) positions; or hold
them to the "male" standard,"4 1 which may lead to their evalu-
ation as less than satisfactory, resulting in fewer, or no pay
raises. Even among women with professional training, less
lucrative jobs are often-if not usually-accepted in order to
incentives and disincentives. For example, by promising housewives
lifelong support, the law created disincentives for women to develop
their economic capacity and to work in the paid labor force. In
addition, by making them responsible for domestic services and
child care, it reinforced the primacy of these activities in their lives,
leaving them with neither the time nor the motivation to develop
careers outside the home. . . . The law similarly reinforced the
traditional male role by directing the husband away from domestic
activities and child care. It encouraged his single-minded dedication
to work by making it clear that his family's economic welfare was his
responsibility.
Id. at 2.
139. RICHARD R. PETERSON, WOMEN, WORK & DIVORCE 109 (1989)
(even before they become mothers, women workers are at a disadvantage
because employers expect them to eventually become wives and mothers who
put paid work at a lower priority).
140. W. Stanley Siebert & Peter J. Sloane, The Measurement of Sex and
Marital Status Discrimination at the Workplace, 48 ECONOMICA 125 (1981).
141. HerbertJacobs, Faulting No-Fault, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 773,
779 ("An alternative theoretical explanation of the plight of divorced women
might be based on the more fundamental problem of sex discrimination in
employment").
142. PETERSON, supra note 139, at 43.
143. Id. That is, the standard to which it is appropriate to hold
someone who has no primary child care responsibilities and has, as well,
someone to do wifely chores which free up time for the worker. For the sake
of completeness, I would harken against imposing such a standard upon men
who have primary child care responsibilities. However, anecdotal data
suggests that such men, because they are atypical and frequently viewed as up
against different odds, are often supported-in their workplace-in their
need to devote more time to their children.
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accommodate the greater burden upon the female parent as
primary care-provider for the children. 144  In some cases,
women employed outside their homes may even have to quit
their jobs because of the strain-or expense, including day
care-of single parenting. 145 Even despite the absence of
articulable legal impediments, practical and psychosocial barri-
ers to economic parity for mothers remain. Despite some
changes in family paradigms, it remains axiomatic that mothers
do most of the "mothering". 4 6  The statutory and common
law that grew up to protect women may have actually put them
in a worse position 4 ' than if they could have merely attempted
to use the ordinary law of contract, assuming a jurisdiction
where a woman could avail herself of notions of detrimental
reliance and quasi-contract-and assuming a judge whose gen-
der bias and experience would not taint his or her decisions-
although as one California family law judge said: "[G]ender
bias is going to rear its head in every single case, because what
other case is there that is gender specific as to the litigants?"' 48
144. See Mary Jo Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market
Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979) (because women have
been expected to assume most parental responsibilities, they must often work
on a part-time basis, take jobs with little responsibility and compromise
employment opportunities); NEIL KALTER, GROWING Up wrrn DIVORCE 10
(1990). But see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretation of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1820 (1990) ("sex segregation does
not persist because women's commitment to the family leads them to
'choose' to consign themselves to lower-paid, female-dominated
occupations" but because it is the preference of more powerful male
decision-makers").
145. James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of
Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 369 n. 118 (1987).
146. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1220 n.147 (1989) (empirical data to
prove that most working women, rather than working men, assume primary
responsibility for children); Schultz, supra note 144, at 1810 n.231 ("studies
have universally found that women do far more child care and other domestic
work than men and that married men increase their share of housework very
little in response to increases in their wives' paid employment").
147. Some argue that modern divorce law has hurt women, either
because of the ease with which spouses can leave a marriage, and a financially
dependent wife, without her concurrence, or because the laws relating to
post-divorce distribution of property leave the non or lower wage-earner in a
worse position than under common law. See, e.g., WErrZMAN, supra note 138;
Suzanne Reynolds, Increases in Separate Prosperity and the Evolving Marital
Partnership, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (1989).
148. Judge Steven Z. Perren, of the Ventura County Superior Court. A
California study revealed that 32.5% of the judges in family law courts in
California were divorced. The authors suggest that that could increase bias
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The voluminous literature that outlines the sore deficiencies in
child-support levels, drawn from judicial decision and later
from statute, might have been moot if women had actually been
able to sue on the notion of the benefit of the bargain. 49 For
example, in a much-talked about non-marital suit, Marvin v.
Marvin,150 the court enforced a contract between two unmar-
against women. I concede that divorced or divorcing women may harbor
similar bias against men, but few of them are sitting judges. CALIFORNIA
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY
COMMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR
WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS 1484c - 3.4 (1990) One may argue, as does
Professor Catherine MacKinnon, that sexual harassment trials present the
same problems. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
(1986); see also Lynn H. Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42
FLA. L. REV. 181 (1990) (summary of the findings of the states that have
initiated gender bias studies).
When the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission
released its findings at a symposium sponsored by the Florida Law
Review, Florida became the ninth state in which a state supreme
court task force on gender bias had documented irrefutably that
gender based biases are distorting the justice system and that the
victims of this distortion are overwhelmingly women.
Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted).
149. Even this conclusion is debatable, however. Women have never
fared well after divorce, despite the mythology of men being "taken to the
cleaners." Only in this century did courts finally decide that a father had a
legal, enforceable duty to support his children. In Baldwin v. Foster, 138
Mass. 449 (1885), Justice Holmes concluded that a father only need support
his children living with a custodial parent if the mother's separation from the
father was justified. See also Nan Hunter, Child Support Law & Policy: The
Systematic Imposition of Costs on Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3 n.16 (1983).
While Blackstone listed a father's duty to support his offspring irrespective'of
custody as a "principle of natural law," this obligation was described as only
"a moral duty without legal remedy." Henry Foster et al., Child Support: The
Quick and the Dead, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1157, 1157 (1975). Although some
early cases approved parental child support, such as Ward v. Goodrich, 34
Colo. 369 (1905); Alvey v. Hartwig, 67 A. 132 (Md. 1907), then, as now,
much of the child support was never paid. See JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
880-85 (1921), cited in Hunter, supra note 149, at 3. A 1948 study of child
support in Detroit found that the divorced wife "receives very little property
from the split of joint possessions, is given very little child support, and in
two-fifths of the cases does not receive this support regularly." WILLIAM J.
GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 222 (1956), cited in Hunter, supra note 149, at 3; see
also Marigold S. Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of
Women and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759, 759-60 nn.2-3
(discussing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws 1908 Report) ("Women have always received an inadequate portion of
the accumulated marital resources on divorce and minimal-or no-alimony.
In addition, the level of child support received from noncustodial fathers has
been disgracefully deficient and enforcement has been nonexistent").
150. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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ried persons, after their separation, in which the woman prom-
ised to perform traditional wifely tasks for the man and the man
promised to provide financial security for the woman. One
wonders if the plaintiff made out so well financially because her
promisor was a movie star, or because she was not "protected"
by the laws applicable to the marriage relationship.
C. Peculiar Financial Problems of Divorced Women
Increasing numbers of children live apart from at least one
parent and thus need a child support award or agreement.
Census figures for 1984 show over fourteen million children
living with only one parent. Of that fourteen million, sixty-
seven percent lived with a divorced or separated parent, eight
percent lived with a widowed parent and the rest lived with a
parent who had never married or whose spouse was absent for
some reason other than marital discord. This is a significant
increase from 1970 which revealed only 60.5% of children
lived in a single parent household due to divorce or separa-
tion.' In 1988, 9.4 million mothers were living with at least
one child under twenty-one years of age whose fathers were not
living in the households.' 52 If current trends continue, one of
every two children born today will spend some time in a single
parent household before reaching the age of eighteen.' 53 The
tragedy of our family law is that women who have been mar-
ried, whose husbands at one point helped to support them and
their children, are often financially traumatized by divorce,
which "per se has enormously adverse economic consequences
for many women."' 15 4 Of women due child support, about half
received the full amount; the remaining mothers were about
equally divided between those receiving partial payment, and
those receiving nothing.1
55
The data that supports the proposition that women are
getting poorer as they become divorced is myriad. ' 56 The stan-
151. These numbers include both children born in and out of wedlock.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORT, MARITAL STATUS & LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 1-5 (1985) (Series P-20,
No. 399).
152. G.H. LESTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY: 1987 (June 1990) (Series P-23, No. 167).
153. I. ELMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 380 (1986).
154. Herbert Jacobs, Another Look at No-Fault Divorce and the Post Divorce
Finances of Women, 23 LAw & Soc. REV. 95, 113 (1989).
155. LESTER, supra note 152. About 5.6 million women were awarded
child support. Id.
156. See, e.g., Heather R. Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory
Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79 (1986). In a study of Vermont couples, the author
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dard of living for divorced parents after divorce changes enor-
mously. The mother with children has an income that drops
dramatically, while the non-custodial father experiences an
equally dramatic increase in per capita income.157 Women and
children suffer by far the greater economic decline at the time
of divorce and over subsequent years than do former husbands,
especially where child support payments from the parent who
lives elsewhere are inadequate and inconsistent. 5 8 Since 1960,
the number of female-headed families has risen steadily both in
absolute terms and as a percent of total families. Over the past
twenty years the percentage of children living alone with their
mothers has increased from about five percent to about twenty
percent.159
These data make clear why poverty seems to be primarily a
woman's problem. Recent studies show that female-headed
families were much more likely to be poor than other types of
families, and the numbers are both shocking and depressing.
About 36% of all female-headed families were poor, compared
to 7.5% of married-coupled families; families maintained by
single mothers with four or more children had a poverty rate of
found that post-divorce per capita income for men rises by 120%, and for
women drops by 33%. This is slightly more dramatic than that found by
Professor Weitzman. See WEITZMAN, supra note 138, at 327-40.
157. LESTER, supra note 152. See, e.g., CHAMBERS, supra note 11, at 76-
77 (Figure 5.1). The Social Security Administration has three categories: the
lower standard budget, the intermediate standard budget, and the higher
standard budget, based upon what percentage of peoples' incomes are spent
on food. Based upon the U.S. Department of Agriculture's "standard budget
line," a figure devised by the Social Security Administration in 1963, only
17% percent of all the couples in a particular study in Genessee County,
Michigan, lived above what the Social Security Administration calls a "higher
standard budget" and around 50% lived between an intermediate and higher
standard budget. See id. at 46 (Figure 4.1). After divorce, 92% of the fathers
who lived alone and failed to pay support lived above the "higher standard
budget." See id. at 47 (Figure 4.2). After divorce, if the non-custodial father
paid support and the custodial mother lived on support only, 59% of all
fathers would be above the "higher standard budget" while only 3% of all
mothers would be above the "lower standard budget," with 97% of all
mothers below the "lower standard budget". See id. at 49 (Figure 4.3).
158. THE PARENTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION: RESEARCH, PRACTICE
AND SOCIAL POLICY 14 (Judith Cassetty ed., 1983).
159. The number of female-headed families increased from 1.89
million in 1960 to 5.72 million in 1983. This represents an increase of from
7% to 19% of all families. In fiscal year 1982, 20% of the 62.4 million
American children under 18 were living with their mother only. See JUDITH
AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 665-66 (2d ed. 1985); see also Judy
Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our
Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989) (70% of all African-American
families below the poverty level had female heads of households).
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST
78.5%, compared to a rate of 36.2% for all families with four
or more children.' 61 One family law judge noted: "The
National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity has pre-
dicted that if the current trend continues, by the year 2000,
women and children will make up 100% of the poor in the
United States." 161
Part of the problem is that, even putting aside the ques-
tions of courts' failures to assess any or sufficient child support
money, fathers simply do not pay.162 This is too often the case
even where the noncustodial parent is able to make the pay-
ments.163 The scale and magnitude of the child support orders
outstanding have escalated to the point of being identified offi-
cially as a serious national social problem.' 64 Six years ago,
5,390,000 women were awarded child support, but only
3,243,000 actually received any payments.' 65 Additionally, the
mean amount of child support payments received amounted to
$1510 annually. If the full amount due had been paid, the
mean amount would have been $2460166 -hardly sufficient but
certainly better than half as much.' 6 7
Court-ordered levels of support are frequently far below
what is practically needed to support the children, and this,
too, adds to women's and children's problems.' 68 Public policy
160. See AREEN, supra note 159, at 665. According to a new study from
the Census Bureau, 15.1 million children live in female-headed households,
and more than 75% of those households fall below the poverty line. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
No. 744, PERSONS BELOW POVERTY LEVEL BY RACE OF HOUSEHOLDER AND
FAMILY STATUS 459 (1990).
161. Kessler, supra note 123, at 30 (citing NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE '80s 19 (1980)).
162. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Theonnes, Supporting Children After
Divorce: The Influence of Custody on Support Levels & Payments, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319,
338 (1988).
163. KALTER, supra note 144.
164. Kessler, supra note 123, at 29.
165. Id. In 1985 and 1986, 8,808,000 women's marriages ended in
divorce. Some 5,396,000 of those women were entitled to court ordered
child support (61.3%). Unfortunately, only 3,243,000 (only 74%) of those
women actually received any support. The data does not suggest that those
women who actually received support received the total amount due to them.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF WOMEN: 1985, at 369 (1990) (Table No. 611).
166. AREEN, supra note 159, at 666.
167. Kessler, supra note 123.
168. Id. (In 1981, there were at least 3.8 billion dollars in uncollected
court ordered child support payments. In November 1983, in the District of
Columbia, 79% of child support orders were not being complied with. A
1977 study in Los Angeles showed that within 6 months after the entry of a
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perspectives on family support obligations suggest that child
support levels are much lower than our laws ought to allow
them to be. '69 Child raising simply demands more dollars than
women have. Although the results from fortified federal and
state child support collection laws are not yet available because
of their nascency,' 70 their passage was prompted by the unbe-
lievable levels of nonsupport. Testimony at the Congressional
hearings on legislation to strengthen child support collection,
which eventually led to the amended uniform support law,
identified "willful disregard of court orders, a pattern that peo-
ple assumed was limited to lower income men, was now com-
mon among fathers of all social classes, because it was asserted
judges failed to enforce the law."'
17'
final divorce decree, one in three men failed to comply with child support
obligations. A Cleveland study determined that most ex-husbands retained
80% of their former personal income after divorce, even after payment of all
child support and alimony obligations); McLindon, supra note 145, at 369
("Women generally are either paying more than half the expenses of raising
their children or drastically reducing their children's standard of living
regardless of their income group.").
169. See, e.g., Charles Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child
Support Guidelines in the States, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 197 (1988); Robert G.
Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support Orders, 21 FAM. L.Q. 281
(1987).
[R]ecent studies have shown that child support awards are critically
deficient when measured against the economic costs of child rearing.
A 1985 study performed for the United States Office of Child
Support Enforcement estimated that $26.6 billion in child support
would have been due in 1984 if child support were set based on
either of two alternative guidelines ... [established in Delaware and
Wisconsin] .... [A] Census Bureau study on child support found
that $10.1 billion in child support was reported to be due in 1983
and $7.1 billion was actually collected. It can be seen from these
two figures that there was a "compliance gap" of $3.0 billion in
1983, but an "adequacy gap" of more than $15 billion.
Id. at 283. Another source reports:
[W]hile the mean amount of child support received by these families
(per family, not per child) increased from $1800 in 1979 to $2110 in
1981, after adjusting for inflation, this represented a 16% decrease
in real dollars. Among poor households in the study, only 40% had
support awards and only 60% of that group actually received any
support at all.
CALEB FOOTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 791 (3d ed. 1985).
170. Jacobs, supra note 154, at 113.
171. WEITZMAN, supra note 138, at 263.
A Congressional witness testified that "confronted with over-
crowded dockets, judges continue to exhibit a great reluctance to
strictly enforce the existing laws. Instead, child support cases are
often subjected to broad and inconsistent interpretation, making a
mockery of our judicial system. The most pathetic aspect of this
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When Congress passed the Uniform Reciprocal Support
Enforcement Act, it did so not only because of congressional
concern over non-payment of support but also to address
insufficient child support awards.' 7 2 To further complicate--or
explain-the problem of insufficient levels of court-ordered
support, there seems to be enormous solicitude for noncus-
todial fathers. Lenore Weitzman, in interviews with California
family law judges, found that greater concern was more often
shown for the husband who had to support the children than
for the wife who had to raise them. The California jurists stress
the importance of maintaining his standard of living and his
incentive to earn.'
7 3
entire tragedy is that parents are unnecessarily subjecting their own
children to substandard levels of living. Both the non-paying
parents, [and] the legislative and judicial branches [of government]
are at fault in this miscarriage of justice.
Id. (quoting Hearings Before the House of Reps., 98th Congress, 1 st Session,
34-290 (1983) (statement of Ruth E. Murphy, Coordinator for Organization
for Enforcement of Child Support)).
172. PUB. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651,
653, 658, 664 (1988)) (amending Part D of Title IV of the Social Security
Act). Congressional intent in mandating uniform support guidelines was to
"meet the problem that the amounts of support ordered are in many cases
unrealistic. This frequently results in awards which are much lower than what
is needed to provide reasonable funds for the needs of the child in the light
of the absent parent's ability to pay." S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
40 (1984), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397. The Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, which forms the basis for most state laws,
including California, was passed to improve child support enforcement
procedures. In part, it helped states and the federal government recapture
money they had provided to unsupported families who received public aid.
According to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee "[tihe enforcement of child
support obligations is not an area of jurisprudence about which this country
can be proud ....... .Id. In addition to providing the states with a
paradigmatic model for their own laws, the federal government assumes an
additional role. It will upon a showing by the state that it has made diligent
and reasonable efforts to collect amounts due using its own collection
mechanisms, use the Internal Revenue Service to collect past due support
from federal tax refunds of a nonpaying noncustodial supporting parent.
These collections may be made on behalf of both AFDC and non-AFDC
families. It will also make available the federal parent locator service to help
find missing noncustodial non paying parents and it assigns to the state an
obligation to collect support for an AFDC child whose rights to support have
been assigned to the state. See Linda Elrod, Kansas Child Support Guidelines: An
Elusive Search for Fairness in Support Orders, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 104, 105 n.12
(1987) (The purpose of URESA and the sanctions behind URESA are that the
federal government will not reimburse a state for welfare payments it has
made to a child who has a living parent who is capable of supporting that
child and against whom the state has taken no collection actions.).
173. Two California judges explained the awards they would have
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Such fraternal protection may account for the typically and
scandalously insufficient child support awards. Mary Ann
Glendon notes that the awards "tend to protect the former hus-
bands' standard of living at the expense of ex-wives and chil-
dren." 17 4 Some observers conclude that the support levels will
be inadequate either because there is too little money available
from the parents' resources, because the judges seem to be
unaware of what it costs to care for and educate a child, or
because the judges make the odd assumption that awards large
enough to be adequate will not be complied with by the par-
ents.' 7 5 One interesting Colorado study found that two-thirds
of the fathers in Denver who were ordered to pay child sup-
port, were ordered to pay less than they spent on monthly car
payments.' 76 Such data are not gimmickry; they are the dismal
facts of life.
The decisions of the California appellate court must be
adjudged against this backdrop of nonsupport, since their
efforts to collect from Messieurs Wilson and Senecker may be
honest attempts to get money for children. Although I might
argue that the courts picked their victims wisely and that the
made: "You have to have money for him to be satisfied, to give him an
incentive to keep earning and improving in his profession." Another judge
observed: "He can't live on less than $7,000 a year and exist. So I have to
leave him with $7,000, that leaves $5,000 of his net income for her."
WEITZMAN, supra note 138, at 17.
174. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 232
(1989). Considering that statutory guidelines for child support are better,
but still insufficient, one may agree with Martha Fineman's conclusion that:
there are, it seems to me, no guarantees that state legislatures are
better institutions than courts in which to achieve justice for women
and children and they may be worse. They too operate in a cultural
context where women's dependency is seen as an embarrassment, an
anachronism, and inconsistent with notions of 'equality'. In
addition, legislatures are filled today with male legislators who
themselves have not been immune from the 'divorce revolution' and
who might be tempted to legislate out of personal experience.
Martha L. Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 781, 786.
175. Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States,
§ 17.1 (2d ed. 1987). See also CASSErY, supra note 158, at 119-20; Carol S.
Bruch, Developing Normative Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of
Current Practice, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49 (1982).
176. See Lucy M. Yee, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An
Empirical Study of Establishment and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in the
Denver District Court, 57 DENV. U.L. REV. 21, 24, 27 (1979) (the study also
revealed that family law judges actually ordered fathers to pay, on the
average, only 56% of what the Denver district court had promulgated as
guidelines for support levels).
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Senecker and Wilson decisions reflect the imbalance of power in
American society and politics, the courts may simply agree with
the conclusion of the United States Senate Committee that the
problems were immense and tragic. The Committee's study of
the problem led to the adoption of the first in a series of Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Acts, which form the
basis for most state laws, including California's.' 77
D. Other Problems Associated with Non-Support
Some commentators believe that a noncustodial parent
who pays child support is more likely to be involved with the
child or children he is supporting. 178 One study notes an inter-
esting point on the purposes for enforcement of child support:
A national survey completed in 1981 by sociologists at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania showed that half of all teenage children
had not seen their fathers in the past year. One-third had not
seen their fathers in the past five years. Of children from sin-
gle-parent homes, only one out of six managed to visit with his
or her father once a week or more. "[A]n unexpected dividend
of legislation to tighten enforcement of child support obliga-
tions may be to increase divorced fathers' involvement with
their children because fathers who pay child support may feel
entitled to participate more actively in their children's lives."' 79
No one has studied whether voluntary compliance with
support orders automatically has a different psychosocial effect
than payments made as a result of legal efforts at enforcement
of delinquent support payments, but it is worth noting that any
payment may improve the lives of the children who depend
upon child support. It takes little rumination to understand
that the lack of child support intensifies the emotional turmoil
177. S. REP. No. 387, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397.
178. Judith S. Wallerstein & Shauna B. Corbin, Father Child Relationships
After Divorce: Child Support and Educational Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109
(1986).
179. AREEN, supra note 159, at 676 n.3. See also Kessler, supra note 123
("Significantly, while there was some correlation between parents who
provided child support and maintained contact with their children (although
the level of child support made little or no difference) 45% of the parents
who provided no support also had had no contact with their children in the
last five years. Thus, it would appear that the payment of child support
promotes a continuous relationship-no matter how tenuous-between
children and their absent fathers."); Frank F. Furstenburg Jr. et al., The Life
Course of Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. Soc.
REV. 656, 665 (1983).
1992]
498 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
of separation and divorce.' 80 Even without hypothesizing
about improving familial relationships, lawyers, judges, and
legislators ought to look at social ramifications of legal actions
in order to inform their decisions in a more efficient way.' It
is patent that children who receive the appropriate financial
support are more likely to fare better generally. 182 One impor-
tant and clear effect of divorce is the deteriorated financial con-
dition-in most cases-of the custodial parent. 183 The purpose
of this paper is not to query whether divorce is good or bad, or
too easy or too difficult to get.'8 4 But it is immoral and naive to
ignore the fact that
a growing body of evidence supports the conclusion that
the social and economic success (or failure) of adults is,
in very large measure, the consequence of the economic
opportunities from which they benefitted as children.
Social scientists have concluded that children from bro-
ken homes are no more likely to become juvenile or adult
criminals or academic failures, for instance, than their
180. McLindon, supra note 145, at 394 ("Mothers are often engaged in
an exhausting struggle simply to keep the family financially afloat. Thus,
children receive less attention from their mothers .. ").
181. Cf. CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANNON, JUDICIAL
POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984);Jacobs, supra note 154, at 112,
113; see also California Judicial Counsel, supra note 148, at 1484C ("To the
extent there is bias in family law cases, and the advisory Committee has found
that bias is a serious problem in this field, the responsibility appears to be in
part that the system has so little valued families that judges are effectively
deprived of the experience, the knowledge, the time and the resources to do
the right thing.").
182. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 25 (1980); see also
KANSAS DEP'T OF SOCIAL & REHABILITATION SERVICES, A KANSAS AGENDA FOR
INVESTING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN 11-12 (1985), cited in Elrod, supra note
172, at 109 n.47 (some of the societal costs of the post-divorce feminization
of poverty are higher rates of children illness, crime, alcoholism, child abuse,
and child neglect); Wallerstein & Corbin, supra note 178, at 119 (42% of
children of divorce had either not entered or had left college before
graduating, despite coming from a wealthy suburban area where 85% of high
school graduates went to college); Elrod, supra note 172, at 110 n.54.
183. KALTER, supra note 144, at 22.
184. In her important book on divorce, WEITZMAN, supra note 138,
Professor Weitzman argues that "liberalized" divorce laws have increased the
problems for custodial parents. That is not my point of view, and, in any
case, it is irrelevant to the issue of whether one particular effort at improving
child support collection, which interferes with other rights, is proper. For a
useful analysis of Weitzman's data and conclusions, see Symposium, Review
Symposium on Weitzman's Divorce Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759-97
(1987), especially Marygold S. Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-
Divorce Plight of Women and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759 (1987).
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counterparts from intact families, if their economic status
does not suffer as a consequence of divorce or
separation. 85
At least one writer argues that society has another reason
to make sure parents support their children:
Among these reasons are included the belief that all chil-
dren have a basic right to be supported by both parents,
to the best of their economic and personal abilities, and
the recognition that society has a vested interest in
enforcing this right for the purpose of encouraging
respect for the law and a sense of personal responsibility
and promoting parental equity in the sharing of eco-
nomic responsibility for children.
18 6
Beyond improving society's chances at having citizens
made more productive and less destructive because of
increased possibilities of financial security, aggressive enforce-
ment of child support obligations reduces demand upon the
system of public welfare. The funds applied, to the mainte-
nance of children who have parents with means can be more
fairly and efficiently used for children who have either no par-
ents or no source of private beneficence. Most of the modern
federal legislation on child support collection is partially moti-
vated by Congress' desire to protect the national welfare
budget from the drain imposed upon it by economically able
parents who disregard their parental obligations.1 8 7" '
Such considerations, both on a micro and macro level, may
suggest that arguments about the motive behind the Wilson and
Senecker decisions are sophistry. If the state's most important
concern is children, then it should not matter how it goes about
collecting child support. And how would other enforcement
alternatives, like jail or liens against fathers' homes, improve
the lives of the unsupported children? There are certainly
compelling reasons for making these two union workers sup-
port their children. But it cannot be inapt to query why them,
when so many others are left alone to disregard the law, as evi-
denced by the sorry numbers of non-supporting parents? And
why aggressive enforcement-in this one instance-which may
not even be effective, when legislators and jurists refuse to
establish decent minimal levels of support?
185. JUDITH CASSETrY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PUBLIC POLICY 47 (1978).
186. Id. at 13.
187. See Harry D. Kraus, Reflections on Child Support, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV.
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IV. SHOULD FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPT CALIFORNIA
APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS?
Beyond wondering whether the California Court of Appeal
ought to have entered the orders in Wilson and Senecker, it must
be determined whether it had the jurisdictional authority to do
so. The most basic issue in any litigation is, frequently, what
law applies. In this issue's simplest incarnation, a court must
determine whether federal or state law applies. In early cases,
the Supreme Court grappled with balancing federal supremacy
with principles of comity and the states' rights to protect
strictly local interests. 8 8 Engrafted upon this judicial concern
that federal law is dominant are those comprehensive enact-
ments of Congress that either explicitly or by implication pre-
empt state law. Even the presence of a federal law that relates
to a subject being litigated does not determine whether the
states will be preempted.' 89 It is no easy question. But I argue
that a state court's jurisdiction to enforce its orders, upon
which the orders in Senecker and Wilson were based, should not
188. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964) (state may not
prevent parties from suing in federal court); Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941) (federal courts have limited power to enjoin state
courts' action); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (where
substantive law is involved, federal courts must apply the same law the state
court would apply).
189. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617,
619 (1958), the Court called its job "Delphic" in nature. One observer
writes:
The comparison of the Court's interpretation of congressional will
with the procedures at ancient Delphi was pertinent. At Delphi, the
"holy ones," or priests, were charged with the responsibility of
interpreting the will of Apollo, expressed through the Pythia, his
prophetess. Originally, the Pythia was a virgin, a virgin being "the
purer vehicle for divine communication," according to tradition.
20 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Oracle 142 (11 th ed. 1911). Later, however,
using possibly the earliest recorded legal fiction, the Greeks changed the rule,
and a married woman over 50 years of age attired as a virgin was employed as
the Pythia. Inspired by mystic vapors, she spoke the will of Apollo. Her
utterances may have been only unintelligible murmurs, but they were inter-
preted into relevance and set in metric or prose sentences by the "holy
ones." According to Plutarch:
[s]o great became the fame and influence of Apollo that all Greece
resorted to his instrument and mouthpiece at Delphi for information
on cult procedure, politics, law and personal conduct in everyday
affairs, from monarchs and tyrants to ordinary individuals, in spite of
the fact that the responses were for the most part vague, evasive and
ambiguous, especially on critical questions.
Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secretary of State, 201 N.W.2d 83, 95 n.21 (Mich.
App. 1972) (quoting EDWIN OLIVER JAMES, THE ANCIENT GODS 244 (1960)).
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extend to situations and relatoinships covered by federal law.
Although a family law court should enforce its orders anyway it
can, it should be preempted from acting when to do so impli-
cates a labor union.
Perhaps no other area of law is so pervasively dominated
by federal rules than the area of employment and labor rela-
tions.190 The bulk of federal law does not, however, clearly
delineate when states are precluded from acting, and the scope
of preemption remains unsettled. 9 ' Most courts, in all con-
texts, have concluded that the relationships among private sec-
tor "labor unions, union members and employers are governed
solely by federal law."' 92 Generally, any other interpretation
190. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA"), codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1988) (establishment and identification of
unfair labor practices by both employers and unions; exclusive jurisdiction
lies within the agency, the National Labor Relations Board, established to
administer the Act); Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"),
codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (1988)
(generally provides for concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts
with mandatory application of federal substantive law); Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-60, 164, 186-187, 401-402, 411-415, 431-440, 461-
466, 481-483, 501-504, 521-531 (1988) (regulates internal relationships
between unions and their members; specifically authorizes state court actions
in certain discreet circumstances); Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1988) (does not specifically
address preemption but lodges most claims with the National Railway
Adjustment Board, which administers the Act and adjudicates most "unfair
labor practices and grievances"); Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA"), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)
(specifically includes a preemption provision which has been expansively
interpreted to prevent state regulation of areas relating to administration,
funding, and benefit provisions of pension and other employee benefit
plans).
191. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law
Preemption, 41 OHIO S. L.J. 277 (1980). Professor Cox concluded "[iun the
field of industrial relations, there has been more than thirty years of fighting
over the boundary lines to finding the realm of exclusive federal control." Id.
at 277. It can be argued that the additional ten years since his ruminations
have not clarified the rules, and his conclusion that principles governing
federal pre-emption and exclusive application of federal law do not lend
themselves to "logical consistency" or to a "coherent and continuing body of
law" remains correct. Id. at 300; see also Daniel N. Kosanovich, Inching Through
the Maze: Recent Developments in Pre-emption Under the NLRA and the Impact of
Caterpillar, Hechler, and Others, 4 LAB. LAw. 225 (1988).
192. Globig v. Johns-Manville Sales Co., 486 F. Supp. 735, 740 (E.D.
Wis. 1980) (citing Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971)); accord International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (Court refused to allow state to
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could decimate unions and disturb national labor policy. How-
ever, the instant cases are unique in that the courts' inquiry and
interest does not involve the relationship between the employ-
ees and their unions in the ordinary sense; herein the union is
clearly a tertiary player in the main contest between divorced
parties, with the state as enforcer of family law orders.
There are arguments both for and against preemption.
The arguments for preemption in this case are the same as in
any run-of-the mill case, and derive from Congress' and the
Supreme Court's reasons for applying it. The causes for con-
cern include cognizance of the fact that the state action
involved runs contrary to the philosophy of the .National Labor
Relations Act, which encourages union organization and collec-
tivization; a respect for the principle of primary jurisdiction,
which would make the National Labor Relations Board the
first-and only proper-forum'9 3 if the union's job referral
practices which guaranteed the delinquents a shorter-than-
average job constitute an unfair labor practice;' 94 a desire to
maintain the union's bargaining power; and lastly, the recogni-
tion of the historic antipathy of local judges to union activity.
The reasons that militate against the application of pre-
emption, are, in this case, nearly in equipoise with the denial of
state court jurisdiction. Even in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon, the Supreme Court's seminal-and strongest-affir-
mation of preemption,"' the Court defers to a state's right to
adjudicate matters of intense local interest. Family law is a
purely local province (despite the encouragement of better
local laws through URESA), a conclusion reinforced by the
judicially approved family law exceptions to the application of
apply its anti-trust laws to previously collectively bargained-for truck rental
and lease arrangements); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (states could
not restrict freedom of employees to select their own bargaining agents,
freedom protected by § 7 of NLRA).
193. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
194. In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978), the Court did not exclude the state of
California from hearing a trespass action involving the situs of picketing,
even though the legality of the picketing in the first place was clearly within
the NLRB's primary jurisdiction because "the controversy which Sears might
have presented to the Labor Board is not the same as the controversy
presented to the state court." Id. at 198; cf. Farmer v. Local 25, United Bhd.
of C &J of Am., 430 U.S. 290, (1977) (Although Court found state tort not
preempted, it did so in part because the claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and battery could be resolved without "accommodation of
the special interests of unions and their members in the hiring hall context.").
Normally, however, unfair labor practices are not resolved in state courts.
195. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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federal pension law, ERISA, the reach of which is pervasive,
even before Congress approved those exceptions through
amendments to ERISA. 96  The proscriptions under the
National Labor Relations Act do not apply to the actor here,
the State of California.' 97 Finally, this does not directly involve
the type of relationship-that is, union versus employer,
employee versus union, and so forth-that calls preemption
analysis into play.
A discussion of whether California could exercise its juris-
diction in a family law case in a way that impacts upon a feder-
ally established and controlled relationship-between a union
and its members-is, perforce, wrought with schizophrenic
declensions. On the one hand, because of the importance and
local nature of the subject matter--child support-and since
the burden imposed on the union has little to do with its posi-
tion vis-a-vis its bargaining counterpart, preemption seems
inappropriate. But, because the joinder is directed at a union,
and because the obligations being imposed upon it do affect
the beneficiaries of what critics call "protectionist" legisla-
tion, 198 the threat of interference is more than specious. 199 As
in the First Amendment area, the merest hint of interference
coupled with the appearance, if not the presence, of bias
against a politically disfavored group, and compounded by the
196. Retirement Equity Act amendments to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1056
(1988).
197. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988), reads:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any
person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.],
as amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than
when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of
officer or agent of such labor organization.
198. See Charles Fried, Individual Collective Rights in Work Relations:
Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REv.
1012 (1984); Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Cm. L.
REV. 988 (1984).
199. Cf the dissents of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell in
Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983), which disagreed with the majority's
approval of individual state suits for breach of contract brought by
strikebreakers who lost jobs the employer had promised were permanent,
after the employer had settled an unjust labor practice charges by rehiring
the strikers and dismissing the replacements. The dissenters would have
preempted the state claims which lay "at the core of federal labor policy." Id.
at 524. I agree with the dissenters, and see how Wilson could interfere with
federal regulation of labor relations.
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limited utility of the solution, leads me to argue against these
orders.
A. Historical Purpose and Application of Preemption
The logic behind preemption and the exclusive application
of federal law to relationships between and among employees,
their unions, and their employers, is that preemption is the
only means to effectuate the purposes of Congress in establish-
ing what federal labor laws there are and to guarantee legal
uniformity among the important and integral relationships
described. It seems generally agreed that federal law will pre-
empt state law in three general areas: where the Court has
required deference to the comprehensive administrative
scheme and the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board;200 where the state attempts to regulate mat-
ters that are inextricably linked with interpretations of, or
problems arising out of, collective bargaining relationships;
20 '
and, where state adjudication may disturb a federally estab-
lished balance of power between labor and management.20 2
200. See discussion of Garmon, infra.
201. The culmination of these relationships are, of course, the
collective bargaining agreements. These contracts are comprehensively
subject to federal labor law. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (union safety promises in the context of
training and referral from hiring halls are subject to federal breach of
contract analysis and do not give rise to common law tort actions); Allis
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985) ("questions relating to
what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences
were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by
reference to uniform federal law"). Two alternative arguments for the
application of federal preemption to these two cases are that the hiring hall
relationship arose out of a contract between the employer and the union.
The first is a breach which is cognizable only as a federal wrong under § 101
of the 1982 Labor Management Relations Act. See Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The other argument is that the union
violated its duty of fair representation, which is also evaluated under federal
law, either as an unfair labor practice or as a federal contract claim. See
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enf denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963) (union has a duty to represent all employees in the bargaining unit)
(regarding unfair labor practices); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local
6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989) (regarding federal contracts claim); DelCostello v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (also regarding federal
contracts claims); see also Lorainne Schmall & Martha Malin, The Duty of Fair
Representation: Enforcement & Remedies, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE
UNION 422-93 (Martha H. Malin ed., 1987).
202. See Ray E. Smith & David A. Kayes, Preempting State Regulation of
Employment Relations: A Modelfor Analysis, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 35 (1985).
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Primary jurisdiction is a term which means that labor ques-
tions should be resolved by the agency Congress created for
that very purpose. It was explained in Garmon, in which the
Supreme Court set forth a general standard for determining
when state proceedings or regulations are preempted by the
primary jurisdiction of the Labor Board. The Court noted that
whenever an act is "arguably protected or prohibited" by the
National Labor Relations Act, "states as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with
national policy is to be averted."2 0' In Garmon, the Supreme
Court decided that a California state court could neither issue
an injunction against peaceful picketing nor award damages
against the union for violation of state trespass law. Among the
reasons for its decision was the Court's conclusion that labor
issue are complex, should be resolved pursuant to the precise
and reticulated legislation that relates to them, and are best left
to the NLRB.
Garmon may be more apt in the instant case for its purport
than its holding. The failure of a union to voluntarily relin-
quish the name of a potential employer of a delinquent father/
union referee-or its failure to help or make its members com-
ply with their child support obligations-are neither protected
nor prohibited by the NLRA. The Wilson and Senecker orders
affect the labor relationship only indirectly. Consequently, the
notion of specific unfair labor practices defined by the Act, the
resolution of which, under Garnon, would require deferral to
the NLRB, may be inapposite under Wilson and Senecker. But
such analysis cannot be so perfunctorily dismissed. There is a
possibility that the union, in the way it has operated the hiring
hall, has committed an unfair labor practice.20 4
B. Hiring Halls and Unfair Practices
Hiring halls are unique from most employment situations,
and the Supreme Court has concluded that nearly all hiring hall
203. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245
(1959).
204. The analysis which follows is nearly identical to that which would
be appropriate if the method of referral by the two defendant unions were,
alternatively, violations of the unions' duty of fair representation or breaches
of collective bargaining contracts. Although in the latter case, the forum
would not be the Labor Board, the reasons for federal preemption are
identical to those for primary jurisdiction in all meaningful ways. In any case,
federal, and not state law, must control, regardless of forum. See generally
Schmall & Malin, supra note 201.
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cases are appropriately within-if not exclusively, at least pri-
marily-the jurisdiction of the NLRB. 20 5 Both parties to the
instant suit allege that hiring hall jobs are uniformly short
term.206 That may or may not be true. Often a hiring hall
referral leads to permanent employment. In the instant case,
where the employee actually worked at any given job no longer
than two or three weeks, there is some reason to believe that
the hiring hall process itself was abused, and the union may be
violating the National Labor Relations Act in its operation of
those halls.2 °7
205. See Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v.
Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963) (if there is a possibility of unfair labor practice
on the part of the union, the case is within the jurisdiction of the NLRB);
Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Structural & Ornamental Workers Union v.
Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963) (any hiring hall conflicts must be addressed as
unfair labor practices by the NLRB). But see Breininger v. Sheet Metal
Workers Local 6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989) (unfair referrals which are unfair labor
practices, but also cognizable as breaches of the duty of fair representation,
are not within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction, but federal law is still
exclusive jurisdictional basis).
The operation of hiring halls was first upheld by the NLRB in Mountain
Pacific Chapter of the Ass'n Gen. Contractors, Inc, 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957),
enforcement denied, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959) (unfair for an employer to hire
only union members referred from the hiring hall). The Board recognized
that
it was to eliminate wasteful, time consuming, and repetitive scouting
for jobs by individual workmen and haphazard uneconomical
searches by employers that the union hiring hall as an institution
came into being. It has operated as the crossroads where the pool of
employees converges in search of employment and the various
employers' needs meet that confluence of job applicants.
Id. at 896 n.8. In Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667
(1961), the Supreme Court found that hiring halls, operated by union as
sources of employees for employers who had a contract with the union, are
not themselves violative of the NLRA, as long as the referees need not belong
to the union.
206. In re Marriage of Wilson, 209 Cal. App. 3d 720, 257 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1989); Senecker v. Senecker & Butchers' Union Local 532, No. AD42450
(Ca. Ct. App. 2d 1988).
207. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 450, 267
N.L.R.B. 775, 803 (1983); Local 394, Labors' Int'l Union of N. Am., 247
N.L.R.B. 97, 114-16, 129 (1980); Labors' Int'l Union of N. Am., Local 394,
247 N.L.R.B. 97 (1980) (union bears the burden of proving objective and
non-discriminatory criteria were used for referrals out of the hiring hall);
Barbara J. Fick, Political Abuse of Hiring Halls: Comparative Treatment Under the
NLRA and the LMRDA, 9 INDUS. REL. L. J. 339, 347 (1987) ("In distributing
these jobs, a dispatcher can discriminatorily match jobs by referring his
friends to the longer terms jobs while sending other applicants to the shorter
jobs.").
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST
It is important to note that hiring halls are not necessarily
orderly processes or, for that matter, even halls. Some unions
keep no list of referees at all, but simply give referrals to those
individuals present at the hall at the time the request for work-
ers is received.2" 8 The phrase 'hiring hall' is a term of art, and
while some unions have offices that are nearly identical to a
state employment office, others have the spouses or children of
business agents take calls from employers and serve as interme-
diary between them and people looking for work. Some union
hiring halls are even operated from a dispatcher's home,2 0 9 or
from an office within the union's business office. And while the
concept of an out-of-work list suggests that the applicant signs
the list, many unions permit oral notification of availability by
the applicant to the dispatcher, who then places the name on
the list. Moreover, an out-of-work list might not even exist.
Some dispatchers attempt to keep "in their heads" the infor-
mation concerning who is available for work and their respec-
tive priority rankings. 2 10 There are often no records kept to
indicate what job openings were available with what employers
and which applicants were referred by the hall. 2 1' Finally,
there are frequently no written guidelines available to deter-
mine referral rules and priorities.
21 2
If Wilson and Senecker changed jobs frequently, there are
indicia that something is rotten in Denmark (or San Fran-
cisco). 2 13 One may conjecture that these fathers asked for jobs
of short duration. There is little chance of every job over a
208. See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., Local 394, 247 N.L.R.B. 97
(1980); see, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 406 v. NLRB,
701 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1983) (union could not change longstanding hiring
hall policies in a manner that was intended to deny an employee
employment); Polis Wall Covering, 262 N.L.R.B. 1336 (1982), enforced in part,
717 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1983) (union hiring hall may not discriminate against
any union member utilizing the union's hiring hall).
209. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, Local 350, 164
N.L.R.B. 644 (1967).
210. Fick, supra note 207, at 245; see, e.g., International Bhd. of
Teamsters Local 328, 274 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1985); United Ass'n of Plumbers,
Local 619, 268 N.L.R.B. 766 (1984).
211. See supra notes 207-09.
212. Fick, supra note 207; see, e.g., NLRB v. Laborers' Int'l Union, Local
644, 810 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1987); Iatse Local 646, 270 N.L.R.B. 1425
(1984); Journeyman Pipefitters Local 392, 252 N.L.R.B. 417, 420-21 (1980),
enforcement denied, 712 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1983).
213. See Fick, supra note 207, at 346-50 ("Because of the unique
relationship between a hiring hall dispatcher and applicants for referral,
possibilities of abusing the system to the detriment [or the benefit] of
individual applicants are present.").
19921
508 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
three-year period being too short to bring a father into a post-
judgment supplemental proceeding to tell the court where he
is working. It is more likely the case that skilled workers use a
hiring hall only temporarily; either because the workers are
inept and employers refuse to accept them as referrals, or
because they are hired permanently by an employer whose first
contact with them was through the hiring hall. If there were a
conspiracy between the union and the delinquent to help the
father evade his child support obligations, the union's hiring
practices could be unfair and would likely be deemed to
encourage union membership in violation of the NLRA. 14
Anyone can bring a charge against a union under federal law,
including the state-or the nonsupported mother."1 5  Of
course, neither she nor the state could get the relief they
sought, i.e.-the name of the potential employer. In the past,
however, lack of remedy available from the NLRB has not pre-
cluded the application of primary jurisdiction principles,21 6 or
the ability of the NLRB to act.2" 7
An employer is not obligated to hire every individual sent
from a hiring hall; even in what is called an exclusive arrange-
ment, the employer is merely obligated not to seek or hire
applicants from any other source. An employer may also retain
the right to seek and employ applicants from alternate sources
when the union hiring hall is unable to meet the employer's
labor needs within a specified time period-usually twenty-four
214. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1988). One must argue that the special
treatment was on account of union membership in order to actually be an
unfair labor practice. Laborers Local 135, 271 N.L.R.B. 777 (1984). It may
also be an unfair labor practice in the DFR context, or a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. In certain cases, discriminatory treatment in hiring
hall referrals may be violative of another federal law, the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988), a law over which
states and federal courts share jurisdiction. Although arising under different
circumstances, and arguably illegalized by several different federal laws,
preemption will still be an issue. See, e.g., Murphy v. International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, Local 18, 774 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1017 (1986).
215. Cusano v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 898, 903 n.8 (3d Cir. 1951) (only the
filing of a charge by a person outside the Board can "provide the spark which
starts the machinery of the Act running").
216. Local 1199 DC, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. National
Union Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 533 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
217. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (although it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to report undocumented workers to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service in retaliation for the workers'
election of a union representative, there is no remedy because the Board
cannot order reinstated any worker who is not legally able to work).
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or forty-eight hours-without violating the union contract.2 t8
This adds another dimension to the argument that Wilson and
Senecker were bad decisions: they may not increase the likeli-
hood that the wages of a delinquent father will be attached,
either because he will not be hired, or his employment may still
not be of the duration necessary for the attachment.
The National Labor Relations Act prohibits any discrimi-
nation among or between union supporters and those who
choose not to affiliate with-or even eschew-the union, if it
tends to encourage or discourage union membership. It is, at
the least, a tenable argument that a standing order from a court
that a union release the names of potential employers to the
state may discourage union membership, especially where that
membership means that virtually all employment is through a
hiring hall. The statutory proscription comes into play when-
ever the action directed against the individual is motivated by
the employee's status qua union member.2 19 If an employee
218. See Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs, Local 4, 189 N.L.R.B. 366 (1971)
enf'd, 456 F.2d 242 (1st Cir. 1972); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EXCLUSIVE UNION
WORK REFERRAL SYSTEMS IN THE BUILDING TRADES (1970) cited in Fick, supra
note 207, at 344 n.16.
219. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
Neither the employer nor the union must act discriminatorily to encourage or
discourage union membership. To wit:
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided,:
That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or
assisted by an action defined in this subjection as an unfair labor
practice) to require as a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is
the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the
appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement
when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in
section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective
date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a
majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have
voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make
such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify
any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a
labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing
that such membership was not available to the employee on the
19921
510 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6
changed jobs too frequently for the state to procure a wage
attachment for delinquencies, as happened with Wilson and
Senecker, but that employee were not associated with a union,
the state would have to find some other way to collect unpaid
child support. It could not mandate that the union, a stranger
and third party in a family law action, help catch up with the
delinquent. It is, therefore, beyond dispute that the fact of the
delinquent fathers' union affiliation makes an important differ-
ence in how the state attempts to collect these delinquencies.
Similar to the First Amendment implications of the Wilson
and Senecker orders, the conflict between them and federal labor
law and policy may be more potential than kinetic."' Ostensi-
bly, the fact that the delinquent fathers in each case actually
belonged to the union was irrelevant to the courts' holdings.
But his association with the union is what subjects him to the
unique collection efforts in each case. The salient characteristic
of each was that his job referrals were had through the union.
As a consequence, the union could inform the state of the
names of potential employers, who could, under the state fam-
same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members,
or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership
was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership;
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988); and
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to dis-
criminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground
other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1988). Whether Wilson and Senecker were actually
union members is irrelevant; their association with the union is critical.
220. The case would be entirely different if a state court had ordered a
union to divulge its membership lists so that the district attorney could find
out if any delinquents were union members, and therefore subject to a Wilson-
type order. Analogous to the first amendment area, such an order would
clearly offend the constitution under cases like Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); and
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). There would also be serious
federalism concerns with such intrusive and patently anti-collective-
bargaining inquiry. In the two instant cases, the court. knew of the
delinquents' union membership.
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ily law act, be ordered to withhold the wages of the fathers to
satisfy the delinquencies.
There is reason to conclude that a domestic relations order
would discourage workers from seeking membership or affilia-
tion with a union for purposes of securing employment and
therefore render such parents even less likely to pay child sup-
port. Union hiring halls are typical in industries where the
work is highly skilled, and therefore, considerably more remu-
nerative than for unskilled work; and, where the needs of any
or perhaps all employers are not constant. In addition, workers
who get jobs out of union hiring halls are paid the union-nego-
tiated wage, which is statistically (even if not in every individual
case) higher than employees who work as "independent" con-
tractors for an employer.22' Often, seasonal or temporary
employees who do not get their jobs through a hiring hall do
not qualify for any fringe benefits, either.222
It is logical to presume, therefore, that if Wilson or
Senecker gave up the privilege and benefit of the hiring hall in
order to evade the state's additional attempt at securing pay-
ment of child support arrearages, their children's chances of
being supported are even more diminished. Without the
union, each father would be faced with one of a few seemingly
unattractive alternatives. He may work in the same industry, in
temporary jobs, for less money. He may attempt to get a per-
manent position within the same industry, in which case the
state would be able to successfully attach his wages eventually
without the help of the union. He could work "underground"
and not report his income, which would subject him to other
legal sanctions, including from the state and federal tax author-
ities. Finally, he could not work at all.
C. Federal Labor Proscriptions and the State as Actor
In joining the union, the state has burdened an entity that
owes no debt to the delinquent-unlike his employer-and
serves only as his political and bargaining agent. The court has
extended itself in a child support collection case in an aggres-
sive and unique way.223 That raises the specter of animus
221. Union wages are generally higher than nonunion wages. For
example, non-unionized persons in the manufacturing field earn $313 weekly
to unionized persons' $389 weekly. Non-unionized transportation workers
earn $472 to unionized transportation workers' $482. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, Tables 684, 661 (1989).
222. B.G. Costich & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1980).
223. Concededly, there are other instances of creative and aggressive
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against unions. Although the court in Wilson noted that "[a]ny
intrusion upon rights conferred constitutionally or by federal
labor law was justified here by the compelling state interest in
enforcing child support orders and the demonstrated absence
of a less restrictive alternative," ' 24 there is no evidence that the
court even considered a less restrictive alternative. Further-
more, this type of creative collection effort seems to be suspi-
ciously absent in other contexts, since nearly one-half of all
fathers do not pay.
There are other concerns. One may conjecture about why
release of confidential information concerning where one
works could discourage union membership, apart from wanting
to evade legal process. An employee may have several impor-
tant reasons for wanting to maintain his or her privacy regard-
ing where he or she works or applies for work.225 A union
member ought not feel that his membership means that his
union must work against him in domestic relations areas.
There are few good reasons to not pay child support-and
those reasons will surely be recognized by a male-friendly
court. But delinquent payors should not have to eschew collec-
tive labor activity. Unions exist to help, among others, sup-
porting noncustodial parents earn more money. Unions are
not enforcers of family law orders.226
child support enforcement. For example, a court may inquire into the level
of earning of a parent ordered to provide support for his or her children.
The court may demand proof of a supporting parent, to see if he or she is
willingly earning less than necessary to support a child. In re Marriage of
Dennis, 344 N.W.2d 128 (1984), the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded
that it may require a divorced father to make a search for other employment
to increase or to add to his limited income in order to satisfy his child support
obligations. The court found the decision in Dennis was commensurate with
its earlier decision in Balaam v. Balaam, 187 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1971) where it
held
a divorced husband should be allowed a fair choice for means of
livelihood and to pursue what he honestly feels are his best
opportunities even though he might for the present, at least, be
working for a lesser financial return. . . .This rule is, of course,
subject to reasonableness commensurate with his obligations to his
children and his former wife.
Id. at 871.
224. Wilson, 209 Cal. App. 3d 720, 723, 257 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479 (1989).
225. Of course, even where the concerns are constitutional and not
merely statutory, a union member cannot claim sanctuary from lawful process
simply by virtue of union membership. New York ex rel. Bryant v.
Zimmerman, 278 U.S 63 (1928).
226. If the government wants unions operating as hiring halls to be
considered employers for purposes of child support enforcement, the law
should be amended to provide for that. Since there is no debt owed to a
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The state of California is not a covered employer under
the NLRA.227 However, even though California and its courts
cannot commit an unfair labor practice illegalized by the
NLRA, the state may be prohibited from joining the union as a
defendant since a "second preemption doctrine protects
against state interference with policies implicated by the struc-
ture of the Act itself...228
Such a conclusion is part of another branch of preemption,
related to concerns about federal labor policy, which requires
the application of federal law to situations where the two pri-
mary parties to an actual or potential collective bargaining rela-
tionship are exercising their respective legal muscle in some
type of contest. In Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relation Commission, the Court opined that these battles should
be left unregulated by local law, controlled only "by the free
play of economic forces." ' 229 The Court has been concerned
with maintaining a balance of power, allegedly provided by the
National Labor Relations Act. 230 An argument can be made
that there is nothing being imposed upon the unions herein
that would patently diminish their bargaining power relative to
their employer-counterpart/adversary. But, if the California
courts' orders actually reduce the ability of the union to organ-
ize workers and recruit members, it may become an emasculate
bargainer. Because it is the articulated policy of the NLRA to
promote collectivization and bargaining, 23 1 and since there is
at least a tenable concern that Wilson and Senecker could impose
some constraints on the union, this conflict between the two
fora-state and federal-cannot be completely ignored. There
are no bright lines in determining whether state action must be
preempted; these issues are often "translated into concreteness
by the process of litigating elucidation. "232 Although some
general pattern emerges, often inexplicable tolerance of state
member by the union, it is hard to see how the union could be treated as an
employer under law. At least, however, federalism problems would be
resolved, as they were when ERISA was amended to except alienation of
benefits for use to satisfy domestic relations orders.
227. Jervis Pub. Library Ass'n, 262 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1982) (operators of
public library granted exemption because library was an arm of the state).
228. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749 (1985).
229. 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976).
230. See CLYDE W. SUMMERS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR
LAw Ch. 6 (1982). Whether federal law actually created an industrial
equipoise is a debatable point raised by these authors.
231. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
232. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619
(1958).
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action by the Supreme Court233 has made definitive statements
of preemption principles impossible.
D. State Family Law as a Unique Exception
From a slightly different perspective, an argument can be
made that, whatever the preemption issues, California ought to
be able to effectuate its family laws. 234 Although the Supreme
Court is perennially concerned with state interference in labor
relations, a field enormously interesting to and frequently leg-
islated upon by Congress, greater deference is afforded the
states when they act on matters historically within their police
powers, that is, the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens,
than in other areas. 35
Over a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court concluded
that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States. ' 236 Typically, the Court
broadly searches the history and the pervasiveness, not only of
the particular federal statute, but all general legislation in the
area, to attempt to glean however nebulous a Congressional
217purpose to preempt state action in a specific case. It seems
the inquiry is narrowed in the area of domestic relations, with a
233. See e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987)
(individual employment contracts in a unionized setting are not completely
preempted by federal law); New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of
Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (New York's award of unemployment
compensation to employees who are out of work because of their affirmative
decision to strike does not interfere with the balance of bargaining power).
234. In Wilson, the court relied upon California Civil Code § 4380,
which gives the family law court authority to enforce its judgments by such
orders as the court in its discretion may deem necessary. Wilson, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 479.
235. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987) (state can require employers to grant special leave to pregnant
workers without violating federal laws against discrimination on the basis of
gender); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (child labor, minimum wage,
and workers compensation are within states' police power and should not be
overridden by federal law); Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1883)
(states have full power to regulate within their limits and that power includes
regulation of construction roads, canals, and bridges).
236. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (U.S. District Court has
no authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to restore a child to the custody
of the father, when her grandparents, who took her into custody upon the
death of her mother, refused to release her to her father seven years later,
when he was "remarried and was well-prepared to take care" of her. Such
matters "do not depend upon any act of congress, or any treaty of the United
States or its constitution.").
237. See Smith & Kayes, supra note 202.
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concomitant presumption that the state has almost free reign.
The Court has concluded that "[o]n the rare occasion when
state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute,
this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a
determination of whether Congress has 'positively required by
direct enactment' that state law be preempted."'2 " There is
certainly no positive requirement within the NLRA that state
governments leave unions alone for all purposes. In Garner v.
Chauffers & Helpers Local 776, the Court noted: "The National
Labor Relations Act . . . leaves much to the states, although
Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must
spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the
area in which state action is still permissible."2 9
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,240 the
Supreme Court grappled with labor preemption and discussed
it in terms of its broadest applications. The Court recognized
that there would be exceptions to the application of the pre-
emption doctrine. Litigable issues which were "merely periph-
eral" to federal labor law are within the power of the states to
regulate, along with matters which are "so deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility, that in the absence of compel-
ling congressional direction, [the Court] could not infer that




Protection of children living in the state is clearly an
important, if not compelling, state interest. Dating from the
time this century when states enacted their "married women's
acts," there was concern with establishing child support obliga-
tions. 42 In the Uniform Reciprocal Support Agreement Act
(URESA), the federal government has imposed some proce-
dural requirements upon the states in the area of family law,
but only insofar as necessary to encourage them to take a more
aggressive role in collecting child support.243 One reason for
238. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); see also
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (on dissolution of marriage, state
cannot divide military nondisability, regardless of state community property
laws); Liedel v. Juvenile Ct. of Madisco County, 891 F.2d 1542 (11 th Cir.
1990) (federal district court will not review final decision of state court of
competent jurisdiction, in reference to a child custody complaint); Barna v.
Reed, Civil No. 89-4742, 1990 WL 1473 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 9, 1990) (federal
court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over custody proceeding
currently in state court).
239. 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
240. - 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
241. Id. at 244.
242. See Jones, supra note 133.
243. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-659 (1988); Kraus, supra note 187.
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URESA, and the sanctions behind URESA, is that the federal
government does not want to reimburse a state for welfare pay-
ments it has made to a child whose parent is capable of sup-
porting that child and against whom the state has taken no
collection actions. Congress also wants the states to make
capable parents support their children. This is significant,
since one might argue that a state ought not to be found to
interfere with federal labor policy if it is attempting to comply
with clearly stated federal policy in the realm of domestic rela-
tions. Although there is nothing to suggest in Wilson or Senecker
that either family was dumped onto the public dole as a result
of the fathers' delinquencies, the federal child support law was
amended to allow the states to use federal services to locate
delinquent payors even where the nonsupported children were
not on welfare.244 Where two federal laws, each representing
an articulation of Congressional policy, have an impact upon a
particular set of circumstances, the Court must attempt to rec-
oncile them in a manner most likely to effectuate the purposes
of each.245
Many of the earliest preemption cases presented the Court
with matters of intense local concern. Despite their potential
for conflict with the purpose of the NLRA, the Supreme Court
allowed the states to exercise control. However, even cogni-
zant of its deference to family law and health and welfare initia-
tives by the states, in most areas, the Supreme Court has
generally recognized only a narrow exception to federal labor
preemption-typically limited to proscriptions against criminal
violence, trespass to property, and invasion of privacy. One
exception to preemption had already been recognized in 1942
by the Supreme Court in Allen-Bradley Local 111 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board. 46 The Court held that it was
neither unconstitutional nor contrary to the federal labor
scheme for a state court to enjoin strikers who violated state
criminal laws. The strikers were engaged in mass picketing;
obstructed and interfered with ingress and egress at the pick-
eted employer's premises; threatened bodily injury and prop-
erty damage to many of the employees who crossed the picket
line; and actually engaged in violence, threats, coercion, and
assault. These concerns, according to the Court, were strictly
and passionately local.247 In UA W-CIO v. Russell,248 the Court
244. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
245. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
246. 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
247. Id. at 749.
248. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
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refused to vacate a state jury award to an employee who sued a
union for wrongful interference with a lawful occupation. The
plaintiff alleged that union pickets, through threats of bodily
harm, barred his ingress to a plant during a strike. The Court
concluded that the state had the power to act in a situation
involving intimidation and violence.249
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,2 50 a union
expelled one of its members in violation of a California law,
which provided for a cause of action for breach of contract and
recovery of damages for physical and mental suffering. The
Court was not persuaded by the union's argument that its
actions were concededly unfair labor practices under the
NLRA. The Court concluded, as it had in an earlier case, that
"the potential for conflict is too contingent, too remotely
related to the public interest expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act,
to justify depriving state courts of jurisdiction to vindicate the
personal rights of an ousted union member.
' 2 5'
State laws protecting private property owners from tres-
pass are among those matters historically found by the Court to
be of great local concern, and merely peripheral to federal
labor regulation. The decision in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego District Council of Carpenters,252 where the company sued in
state court to enjoin union organizers from patrolling in front
of the store, is consistent with this rationale. The Court held
that a state trespass action was permissible, and not preempted,
since the action concerned only the locus of the picketing-
subject to state control-while the arguable unfair labor prac-
tice preempted under Garmon would focus on the object of the
picketing. As a result, the dispute presented to the state court
was not identical to that presented to the NLRB.253
Another noted exception to the Garmon rule is that made
for a state's overwhelming interest in protecting its citizens
from defamation. However, the exception is not as clear-or as
uncategorically local-as with violence and trespass. In Linn v.
Plant Guard Workers Local 114,254 the Court held that false and
malicious statements made in the course of a labor dispute
were actionable under state law if injurious to the plaintiff's
249. The Court reiterated this principle in Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Electric Railway & Motorcoach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971).
250. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
251. Id. at 621.
252. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
253. Id.
254. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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reputation, even though such statements were arguably unfair
labor practices adjudicable by the Labor Board. However, the
Court reached an accommodation with federal labor policy by
requiring adherence to federal standards for proving actual
damage and malice to make out such a claim, even if filed in
state court.255
Even in some cases where the gravamen of the complaint
devolved from a union's operation of a hiring hall, the
Supreme Court has allowed the states to act. In Farmer v.
Carpenters &Joiners Local 25,256 the Supreme Court found that
neither the policy nor the language of federal labor statutes
preempted a state cause of action by a union member against
his union alleging that, because of his dissident intra-union
political activities, the union had intentionally engaged in out-
rageous conduct, threats, and intimidation, causing him to suf-
fer severe emotional distress and bodily injury. The Court
found that, although as in Linn, part of the action complained
of could have been an unfair labor practice, that is, the union's
duty to lawfully operate a hiring hall from which plaintiff
claimed he was intentionally not referred, the defendant's con-
duct was "so outrageous that no reasonable man in a civilized
society should be expected to endure it."' 257 Since no federal
labor law could remedy his wrongs, the claim was not excluded
from state control. The state, on the other hand, had a sub-
stantial interest in protecting its own citizens from the kind of
criminal abuse and intentionally tortious acts about which
plaintiff complained. Moreover, the potential for interference
with the federal scheme was minimal, since the tort action
could be resolved without reference to (1) any accommodation
of the special interests of union and members in the hiring hall
context-the part of the complaint that was arguably an unfair
labor practice; (2) the collective bargaining agreement; or (3)
the legal status of the union as a plaintiff's representative. 258
But even though the Supreme Court has allowed the states
to take certain matters that affect labor relations into their own
hands, that does not foreclose the possibility that the instant
cases should not be locally governed. The Supreme Court has
preempted certain actions where a state court fails to acknowl-
edge federal policy, even though there may be no articulable
255. The Court required the application of the test articulated in New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (plaintiff must prove defamatory
statements were made with malice and intent to cause damage to plaintiff).
256. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
257. Id. at 301.
258. Id. at 302.
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reason for preemption. 2 9 This harkens to Congressional dis-
trust of parochial jurists whose antipathy to collective bargain-
ing and worker empowerment was, and is, known. The
Supreme Court, in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric, Railway
and Motorcoach Employees v. Lockridge, concluded:
The course of events that eventuated in the enactment of
a comprehensive national labor law ... reveals that a pri-
mary factor in this development was the perceived inca-
pacity of common law courts and state legislators, acting
alone, to provide an informed and coherent basis for sta-
bilizing labor relations conflict and for equitably and deli-
cately structuring the balance of power among competing
forces so as to further the common good.26 °
Dating from the earliest federal legislation regulating injunc-
tive power of the courts, Congress recognized that local judi-
ciaries, with regional political, moral, and philosophical
agendas, simply could not be trusted to effectuate the purposes
of federal law to encourage collective bargaining and protect
the integrity of an institutionalized representative of employee
261voice.
259. The Supreme Court's statements as to the imprecision and
intuition of preemption are myriad. See, e.g., Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 509 (1984) ("It can no longer be maintained ...
[that federal law] necessarily and obviously conflicts with every state
regulation" when discussing the application of the federal preemption
doctrine.); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, (1983) (the Court will
determine state regulation or actions preempted where there is a "risk that
the state will sanction conduct that the Act protects"); E.I. Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) ("unless courts discern from the
totality of circumstances that congress sought to occupy the field to the
exclusion of the States"); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 156-57
(1978) (there is an assumption that the state's powers are not to be
superseded by federal statutes unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress); Farmer v. Carpenter, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977) ("Our cases
indicate . . . that inflexible application of the doctrine is to be avoided").
260. 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
261. The preamble to the National Labor Relations Act states that:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners
in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes
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Not only was a need for uniformity apparent; there was-
and is-a recognition that state, local, and federal public policy
does not always coalesce. Congress, by and large, meant to
leave unions alone-except for holding them responsible for
violation of their statutory duties and proscriptions. 262 Since
the instant orders would not have been entered if the union
were not the job referral source for the delinquent fathers, it
can hardly be argued that the unions' status is irrelevant. The
unions cannot be analogized to an employer against whom a
wage deduction order is entered, because the employer actually
owes a debt-in the form of wages-to the delinquent. The
unions are the collective bargaining agents, and the group
political voice, of these delinquent fathers. They are not obli-
gors. The Wilson and Senecker orders are unlike the cases where
the Supreme Court allowed union members to sue their unions
in state court. They, instead, impose an affirmative obligation
upon unions to become involved in matters that have nothing
to do with their representative or bargaining responsibilities,
but which, if they perform negligently, might begin another
cycle of analysis of federal preemption. These orders impede
Congressional intent and should, I think, not have been
entered.
E. The ERISA Analogy
Whenever an area of law is subject to Congressional con-
trol courts tread gingerly. Even under the Employee Retire-
the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to
the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees....
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice. and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
262. There are, of course, some exceptions to this rule. When a
union's status as union is totally irrelevant, federal preemption and
protection is not in issue. See, e.g., Hulahan v. Sheehan, 522 S.W.2d 134 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975) (plaintiff sued for personal injuries when he slipped and fell
on union hall steps).
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ment Income Security Act (ERISA), the federal law that
protects employee pension benefits from state-ordered attach-
ment, courts frequently concluded that, because of federal pre-
empting these funds should even be protected from satisfying
child and spousal support obligations. It took an act of Con-
gress to convince courts that even such "logical" incursions
into federally-protected domains are appropriate. By analogy,
the Wilson and Senecker orders interfere with federal control and
should not slip by as typical and part of an aggressive system
enforcing child support obligations.
ERISA is a law with pervasive preemption provisions.26
ERISA provides that the federal law "shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan . . .not exempt under § 1003(b) of this
title."' 264  Congress so provided because the states were too
slow in providing for or protecting employee health and pen-
sion benefits. Both the legislative history and the aftersight of
judicial fortification make clear the preemptive strength of the
26statute. 65 The test of preemption is whether the state law
"relates" to any employee benefit plan not otherwise exempt
from the act. Sponsors of ERISA spoke of the breadth of the
preemption provision. Senator Williams said:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exception
specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement pro-
visions of the conference substitute are intended to pre-
empt the field for federal regulations, thus eliminating
the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state and local
regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is
intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of
state or local governments or any instrumentality thereof,
which have the force or effect of law.
266
263. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988). This express and detailed preemption
clause is unique in labor law; preemption is simply implied from the National
Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
265. David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of a State Law: A Study
in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 427, 454 (1987) ("In order to
effectuate the central policy objectives of ERISA, which is to encourage
voluntary pension plan development and to protect and strengthen employee
pension plan rights, ERISA's framers properly thought it essential that
ERISA not be compromised by a host of potentially contradictory state
laws.").
266. 120 CONG. REC. 29 § 933 (1974).
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Congress created only narrow exceptions to preemption,
and applied this principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any
non-federal regulation of employee benefit plans.267
The Burger court, which normally demonstrated what has
been called an "ingrained predisposition to find against the
power of the federal government,, 268 repeatedly endorsed a
broad reading of ERISA preemption. For example, in Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,2 69 the Supreme Court held unani-
mously that a New Jersey law that prohibited pension offsets by
amounts awarded in worker's compensation was preempted by
ERISA because the state law "related to" an employee benefit
plan. The Court reached this conclusion, despite two good
reasons for a contrary result. The first was the precedent which
allowed state regulation in cases of patent local interest, since
worker's compensation is generally considered to be of the dir-
est importance to local residents and a clear example of the
Garmon exceptions to preemption. 270 The second was that the
New Jersey law appeared to comport with the policy behind
ERISA-protection of employees' deferred benefits. But, the
statute was preempted because, according to the Court, it elim-
inated one method for calculating pension benefits-integra-
tion with other public benefits-which was permitted by federal
law.27' The Supreme Court noted:
It is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly,
through a workers' compensation law rather than
directly, through a statute called 'pension regulation.'
ERISA makes clear that even indirect state action bearing
on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclu-
sive federal concern .... ERISA's authors clearly meant
to preclude the state from avoiding through form the
substance of the preemption provision.
272
267. See generally James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal
Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978).
268. Gregory, supra note 265, at 459.
269. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
270. New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519
(1979) (federal law does not preempt the New York statute that allowed the
payment of unemployment compensation to strikers); cf. Baker v. General
Motors Corp., 478 U.S. 621 (1986) (state law which prohibited
unemployment compensation to strikers on the grounds that the state
refused to finance the strikes that caused their unemployment not
preempted).
271. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524.
272. Id. at 525. This commitment to the breadth of the preemptive
force of ERISA was reiterated recently in Mackey v. Lanier Collections
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In 1984, Congress amended ERISA to exempt qualified
domestic relations orders273 to insure that ERISA's anti-
garnishment and preemption provisions could not be used to
block the enforcement-against any choate benefits of the non-
supporting parent-of qualified domestic relations orders pro-
viding for child support. Even before 1984, some courts that
considered the issue found that federal preemption was inapt
in family law order cases2 74 because the purposes of the orders
and the federal pension law were nearly identical. There was
no uniformity on the issue, however.2 75
State courts had to deal with ERISA in those cases where a
custodial spouse attempted to garnish vested pension benefits
that belonged to a delinquent father. Despite the intuitively
correct choice of attaching any money the delinquent may have
to insure payment of court-ordered support, the courts had to
deconstruct ERISA's clear anti-alienation provisions.276 Such
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). The Court refused to allow the
state of Georgia to specifically protect ERISA welfare plan proceeds from
garnishment by general creditors of plan participants. The Court reasoned
that, although ERISA plans were supposed to be protected against
encroachments that would result from beneficiaries' assignment of these
benefits to general creditors, certain non-pension benefits could not be free
from state methods for collecting judgments in the normal course. Not
unlike the issue in Alessi, therefore, even state actions which ostensibly mirror
the concern of Congress that these benefits be protected had to be
preempted because they "relate to" an employee benefit plan.
273. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (1988):
Each pension plan shall provide for the payment of benefits in
accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified
domestic relations order .... [Qjualified domestic relations order"
means a domestic relations order-which creates or recognizes the
existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate
payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable
with respect to a participant under a plan, . . . relates to the
provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property
rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a
participant....
274. See, e.g., Carpenter's Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); AT & T v. Merry, 592 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1979); Senco, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
275. "The courts are divided on the question of whether [ERISA's]
anti-assignment clause applies to state domestic relations orders and also on
the question of whether the pre-emption clause [Section 514 (a)] refers to
State domestic relations laws and court orders." H.R. REP. No. 98-655, pt. 1,
at 30 (1984), cited in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc. 486
U.S. 825, 838 n.13 (1988).
276. ERISA provides that "each pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
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statutory provisions led most plan documents to include typical
anti-alienation language such as:
[T]o the extent permitted by law, none of the benefits
hereunder or payments of any contract of insurance or
property held in any trust hereunder shall be subject to
any claim of any creditor of any member; and shall not be
subject to attachment or garnishment or other legal pro-
ceedings by any creditor of any member or any benefici-
ary of any member; and neither the member nor any
beneficiary shall have the right to alienate, encumber or
assign any of the benefits, payments or proceeds of any
contract issued pursuant hereto or property held in any
trust hereunder.
27 7
The rationale of the courts that decided to allow a spouse
to garnish pension benefits was that Congress created the anti-
alienation provisions, in part, to protect the dependents of the
beneficiaries, as well as to protect the wage-earners them-
selves. 27' For example, in Operating Engineers Local 428 Pension
Fund v. Zamborsky,2 79 the Ninth Circuit observed that family law
had always belonged exclusively to the states, citing the
Supreme Court's decision in In Re Burrus.2 s ° In grappling with
the issue of whether the union-administered pension fund
ought to release money pursuant to a domestic relations order
and subsequent garnishment, the court re-examined the
277. Pepitone v. Pepitone, 436 N.Y.S.2d 966 at 968 (1981).
278. In Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the
court reasoned: "[R]ather than intending to undermine the family law rights
of dependents, spouses and children, the legislature was concerned that
employees and their beneficiaries-the entire family-be protected by ERISA
.... Thus the conclusion is warranted that, like the previous congressional
exemptions, ERISA's anti-assignment or alienation sections were included
only "to protect a person and those dependent upon him from the claims of
creditors," not to insulate a bread winner from the valid support claims of
spouse and offspring. Id. at 1156. The statute itself mandates that:
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
279. 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981).
280. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
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Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, wherein
the Court had opined:
[O]n the rare occasion when state family law has come
into conflict with a federal statute, this court has limited
review under the supremacy clause to a determination
whether congress has "positively required by direct
enactment" that state law be preempted .... A mere
conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and family
property law must do "major damage" to "clear and sub-
stantial" federal interests before the supremacy clause
will demand that state law be overridden.281
Other courts had similarly reasoned. In Pepitone v.
Pepitone, 82 the New York Supreme Court not only ordered that
the famous delinquent father's pension benefits could be
attached to satisfy his support obligations, but that he could be
forced to take a much-reduced early pension benefit in order to
guarantee that his children's welfare would be attended to
more promptly. The court found that Pepitone's arrearage in
alimony and child support of more than $40,000 gave his ex-
wife the right to sequester his pensions benefits and to compel
him to elect early retirement.28 s
In Mallory v. Mallory, 2 4 a New Jersey trial court found that
it comported with the purpose of ERISA to allow a custodial
spouse, whose husband was delinquent in his child support
281. 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); see also Zamborsky, 650 F.2d at 199-200:
[B]y enacting ERISA congress has not "positively required by direct
enactment" that garnishments of the sort at issue here be
preempted. Moreover, it cannot be said that these garnishments
"do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests."
Indeed, portions of ERISA suggest that interpreting ERISA as
precluding the sort of garnishment here at issue would be directly
contrary to its goals and purposes. In § 2 of ERISA .... Congress
made certain findings. Of particular relevance is its statement that it
finds "that the continued well being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by . . .
[employee pension benefit] plans." This establishes that congress
was not only concerned with the welfare of employee participants
but also with the welfare of dependents of employee participants.
Therefore, to now hold that ERISA may be used as a means to
frustrate enforcement of the obligation of an employee participant
to support his dependant spouse, would be contrary to congress'
purpose in enacting ERISA.
282. 436 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1981) (Joe Pepitone played baseball for the
Yankees, and adds support to the prior claim that fathers-across-the-
economic-board fail to support their children).
283. Pepitone, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
284. 432 A.2d 950 (N.J. Super. 1981).
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payments, to levy upon the corpus of an IRA pension fund cre-
ated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 408. The court found that the
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA did not prevent the trans-
fer. The court relied on the justification in an earlier case,
Schlaeffer v. Schlaeffer:
285
[T]he usual purpose of exemptions is to relieve the per-
son exempted from the pressure of claims hostile to his
dependant's essential needs as well as his own personal
ones, not to relieve him of familial obligations and
destroy what may be the family's last and only security
short of public relief.
28 6
The Mallory court also found that if it were to hold that the
corpus was not subject to execution, it would "provid[e] a very
effective vehicle whereby an individual may escape his support
obligations and thereby transfer the obligation and responsibil-
ity for those individuals to the welfare facilities of the state. "287
It made good sense to attach these pension funds. But any
incursions by state courts into a federally-regulated area of law
deserves scrutiny. Even in this instance, Congress felt the obli-
gation to amend ERISA to make clear what kinds of state
actions would not violate the act. Although ERISA's preemp-
tion is codified, it can be argued that the NLRA should not be
preempted for the same reason some courts were loathe even
to order pension benefits attached for the benefit of the benefi-
ciary's children: federal law is pervasive, and if Congress
wanted the states to act despite the presence of federal law and
policy, it would act to let the states know.
2 88
V. THE IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES TO THIS PARTICULAR
STRUGGLE SUGGEST THAT THE RESULTS MAY BE MOTIVATED
MORE BY A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS Quo THAN BY A
RATIONAL DESIRE TO GET CHILDREN THE SUPPORT THEY NEED
At the risk of appearing overly skeptical, the question must
still be asked whether all this possible intrusion and reorganiza-
tion of power is worth the result. Did the court single out these
defendants because they were unionists? Will the Mizzes
Senecker and Wilson get their men-or more importantly-
285. 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
286. Id. at 185.
287. Mallory, 432 A.2d at 954.
288. See Justice Kennedy's dissent in Mackey v. Lanier Collections
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 841 (1988) (The Court should not infer
that Congress would allow general creditor garnishment simply because it
approved domestic relations attachments in its ERISA amendments.).
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their money, in the end? Could all of this have been done a
different way?
Let us assume, for the moment, that the court was-con-
sciously or unconsciously-preserving the social order, and
imposing upon the least favored a burden to support a slightly
less impotent, and slightly more favored group. Certainly,
such a theory is neither new nor totally without merit. Since the
time of the Legal Realists, and now with the currency of Critical
Legal Studies, people have been wondering whether judicial
decisions are not more than a mechanical, formalistic applica-
tion of legal rules, precedents, and statutory interpretations. It
is hard to see that Wilson and Senecker are any different than
those scores of decisions which make the critics disavow the
conclusion that legal decisions are "made on a legal basis
rather than on the basis of social, political, moral or religious
prospectives. '  Even those adherents to the philosophy of
legal positivism and formalism must concede that law is not a
vacuum; that decisions which appear to be nothing more than a
careful application of rules to situations may just as likely
reflect what decisionmakers feel, intuit, or believe. 290 Appear-
ing to be lax in enforcing child support obligations, and assum-
ing a stridency of effort only when the object of that stridency is
as disfavored as the class of unsupported women and children,
seems to comport with what certain legal theorists-who see a
kind of predetermination in judicial decisions-believe. "The
positivist theory of the interpretation of law is directly con-
nected with the social and political ends of juridical positivism
itself: the preservation of legality and of the legal order, the
strengthening of social certainty and the predictability of the
behavior of public authorities .... ,291
289. See David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 243
(1984).
290. It is axiomatic that the decisionmakers tend not to be the
disenfranchised, former Hippies, radicals, or even liberals. There are
dramatically few women, seditionists, and/or people of color on the bench.
In fact, most of the appointments to the federal bench-and to important
positions in the United States Department of Justice-over the last decade
were made among lawyers who, as students, were members of the Federalist
Society-a self-denominated "conservative" group opposed to judicial
activism and dedicated to a "strict construction" of the U.S. Constitution.
This group had as an early advisorJustice Antonin Scalia, whose appointment
was not favored by women, unions, or those groups or persons commonly
considered "liberals."
291. MIECZYSLAW MANELI, JURIDICAL POSITIVISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 97
(1981).
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A. Things Always Go Better For Those Who Are Better
Some scholars (and probably many less "scholarly" who
opine over kitchen tables, in food stamp lines, and at factory
time clocks) argue vehemently that the system is skewed, and
that fairness exists only for those who already get more than
they deserve. Wythe Holt has called this influence upon legal
results "Tilt," which he defines as:
a fancy and somewhat sanitized word for oppression, sig-
nifying that the bias and prejudice which everyone exper-
iences everyday is neither random nor fortuitous. Few
effects of Tilt are clear and unambiguous; although some
people derive a net benefit from Tilt, most are burdened
by it. Tilt favors those with wealth, power, and status but
hurts those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale:
women, non-whites, and third world people.292
Holt argues that people refuse to acknowledge this bias, pre-
tend it can go away, and generally avoid "the problem posed by
Tilt by separating law from politics, attempting to confine their
discussion to an internal, legalistic rationale within which the
legal results might be judged acceptable.
293
Obviously, all of the results in Wilson and Senecker can be
explained away on other grounds. We can say that the reason
there is such a dreadful record of enforcement of child support
is that judges are convinced that the support orders are not
simply rarely enforced but really unenforceable. We could also
posit that there are purely economic reasons for nonpayment
of support, that is, that most nonpayors are too poor to pay
child support in the first place. It may be argued that any
rational judge could see that the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments, and state family laws, require vigorous enforce-
ment efforts and that-at least in this case-the judges were
attempting, perhaps for the first time, to invigorate the
enforcement process. One could guess that the judge con-
cluded that incarceration of a nonpayor parent would have a
devastating effect both upon the potential income and upon the
family commonweal. It could either be a fortuity that unions
often lose and that women often lose, or that neither usually
has the equities or the best prepared and most expensive legal
counsel.
I argue, though, that these two cases comport with theo-
ries of discrimination on the bases of gender and class, and
292. Wythe Holt, Tilt, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280, 280 (1984).
293. Id. at 282-83.
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with the current notions of economic reality: the freedom of
contract, supply-side economics, and other important theories
that have strong theoretical bases and politically potent adher-
ents.294 My brief history of the treatment of unions and women
under law suggests that the two groups share a common expe-
rience of not frequently prevailing.
Some may claim that the California Couirt of Appeal is
responding to what has too long been ignored;2 95 it is possible
that it simply reacted to the many lawyers and scholars who
have finally taken up the cause of women and children and who
criticize our legal system for failing to remediate serious social
problems. One scholar has suggested that
the real "divorce revolution" in recent years has been a
revolution in consciousness-a heightened awareness of
the failure of our divorce system to apportion fairly the
economic burdens of marital dissolution.' The post-
divorce plight of women and children ... has become a
social problem because it has begun to be described as
such, not because it is something new.... It seems likely
that laws which can capture and articulate widely shared
sentiments about the value of child-raising can thereby
increase, at least to a modest degree, their own effective-
ness in dealing with post-divorce dependency. Con-
versely, laws which implicitly tap into the all-too-familiar
currents of egoistic individualism, or into even darker
pools of resentment and group bias, will contribute in
their way to the perpetuation of the problem.
296
It may be that these decisions "[w]hen correctly located within
a broader, more complicated awareness of the nature and his-
tory of common law adjudication .... merely constitute a part
294. See also MACKINNON, supra note 148 (ideological neutrality is the
capstone of an intellectual edifice by which the whole of society is subjected
to the agendas of the dominant class). Discrimination on the basis of race is
likely the most virulent and destructive in our society. However, in the
context of child support enforcement, courts appear to be more motivated by
their own notions of "fair" treatment based upon the just deserts of a
particular gender and class, than by racist considerations.
295. The female Deputy Attorney General, Josanna Berkow, who
argued for the orders in Wilson and Senecker, rejoiced in her victory for
women. See ABA Ctr. on Children & the Law, Child Support Prosecutors'
Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 1 (January 1990).
296. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 238
(1989) (citing Melli, supra note 149) ("Damaging social conditions become
social problems only when they are perceived and advertised as such in public
discourse").
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of the evolution of society's consensual adjustment to felt
needs ... 297
But this feminist victory is less than patent when one
examines who it is opposing these orders. Unions, as discussed
earlier, have always fared poorly, unless their opponents are an
even poorer, le ss powerful, entity.298 The only recent excep-
tion to the rule that those most like an institutional power in
this country always win may be Communications Workers v.
Beck. 29" Beck is an employee who, by virtue of the union secur-
ity provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, is
required to pay union dues even though he chose not to belong
to the union. He, with the help of a nationally-organized coali-
tion of employers and other defenders of "individual" rights,
convinced the Supreme Court that the union had breached its
297. Holt, supra note 292, at 284. However, Holt claims that the
"consensus" that such writers talk about is not an agreement among the
whole, or even the greater part, of society but only among-and essentially
for the benefit of-elite segments and groups. The judges who acted 'in
favor of' women in these two California cases may have actually empowered
unsupported female parents. They may be examples of decisionmakers who
can rearrange, democratize, and infuse with justice the possession of social
status and power, because, in joining the unions and striving to get for these
women what (little) law gave them in the first place, they "act[ed] out of
empathy and intuition." See Claire Dalton, Book Review, The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 234-38 (1983); cf., Holt, supra
note 292, who argues that "most capitalists or macho men are also acting out
of empathy and intuition" and little social change is accomplished. Holt,
supra note 292, at 287 n.35. The California Appellate Court's decision to join
the union rather than imprison Rodney Wilson for not paying years of child
support could be an example of what Peter Gabel argues in his paper on
political imagery:
The fact is that 'our federalism', our 'fundamental values' that were
being carried to the states through the fourteenth amendment and
to private parties through the commerce clause were never really
intended to achieve social justice by abolishing the hierarchy system
and giving power to the large masses of people. They were intended
to maintain these very hierarchies while at the same time satisfying a
very genuine wish within liberal consciousness to 'help' poor people,
third world people, those most oppressed by the system.
Peter Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism: How the Burger Court
Political Imagery Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life, 52 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 263, 269 (1983).
298. See Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the
Courts Do in Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89 (1985) (most plaintiffs who sue their
unions for failure to represent them do not prevail in court); see also Ronald
Turner, Intentional Misconduct and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The
Seventh Circuit's Hoffman Standard, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 43 (1987); Lorraine
Schmall, Workplace Safety and the Union's Duty After Lueck and Hechler, 38 KAN.
L. REV. 651, 664-65 (1990).
299. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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representational duty by using Beck's dues money to advance
the collective political purposes of the union-even though the
union eventually rebated his and the other dissenters' money.
The radical explanation, and the one that fits the paradigm
being suggested here, is that Beck had an institution as his
advocate, to wit, the powerful National Right to Work Commit-
tee, whose interests parallel that of the. owners of capital.30°
Further, Beck's holding reinforces the conclusion that unions
do not generally function as political creatures because the
powers that be do not want them to.
I am not the first to wonder why, even when motivated by
the twin goals of following legal precedent and pursuing jus-
tice, courts and legislators do so much less than they could.3 0 '
Often, courts seem to hinder the very groups about which they
pontificate as needing especial consideration. 0 2 Judges are
300. Cf. Flight Attendants v. TWA, 489 U.S. 426 (1989) (union
members who quit the union and abandon a strike need not be replaced at
the end of the strike by employees who did not abandon the strike but had
more seniority with the employer); Patternmakers League of N. Am. v. NLRB,
473 U.S. 95 (1984) (union members can quit the union at any time, even
during a strike they voted to undertake, and the union cannot discipline them
for quitting); First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)
(employers need not bargain over changes in operations, even if they
permanently displace workers represented by the union, if the changes
involve entrepreneurial decisions other than those about labor costs); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978) (store owner can get state court injunction against peaceful union
picketing protesting store's use of non-union carpentry contractors);
Indianapolis Power & Light, 273 N.L.R.B. 1715 (1985) (general no-strike
clause precludes a union from engaging in a sympathy strike in solidarity with
another local).
301. For an interesting comparison to the fact that the goal in Senecker
and Wilson may have been salutory, but the means and rationale therefore
were faulty, see Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978),
suggesting that decisions under the Wagner Act, by institutionalizing unions,
reinforced the institutional basis for worker oppression, even though the
material conditions of workers were slightly improved.
302. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416 (1977). In
what I take to be an effort by a judge to decry the debasement of women, and
to recognize the importance of work in the home, presiding judge Robert H.
Gardner wrote:
A woman is not a breeding cow to be nurtured during her years of
fecundity, then conveniently and economically converted into cheap
steaks when past her prime.... [T]he husband simply has to face up
to the fact that his support responsibilities are going to be of
extended duration-perhaps for life. This has nothing to do with
feminism, sexism, male chauvinism, or other trendy social ideology.
It is ordinary common sense, basic decency, and simple justice.
Id. at 419-20. Of course, the need to distinguish a woman from an animal,
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either unaware;3 0 3 reluctant to change the status quo or risk the
embarrassment of conspicuous reversal by an appellate court;
or, take on the power structure that installed the judges in their
own positions. They often, it can be said, refuse to choose
"other, more humane options that could make this country a
better place."
°30 4
B. Enforcements as a Small Part of the Problem
Wilson and Senecker clearly do not reflect the least intrusive
and most efficient means of collecting child support. I concede
there are no judicial requirements for the adoption of such a
standard before a state can act. But neither is there a require-
ment that these considerations be wholly irrelevant.
The evidence is overwhelming that states have done
almost everything wrong if they are seriously attempting to
improve the lot of children after divorce. Dissolution of a mar-
riage for people with children is emotionally exhausting, legally
complex, and financially debilitating. Many women do not
even seek child support because they cannot afford to fight for
it, or because they recognize the futility of their efforts. For
those who do, courts and legislatures have yet to arrive at fair
and consistent levels of child support. Finally, courts and state
attorneys general have been unwilling and unable to enforce
and the suggestion that feminism is either comparable to "male chauvinism"
or is "trendy" suggests adherence to the status quo of male legal superior-
ity-and requires a reasoned response beyond this brief note. Cf. ALAN
DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 10 (1981).
303. CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, DRAFT REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR
WOMEN & MEN IN THE COURTS, Part 5-4 (1990) ("the system has so little
valued families that judges are effectively deprived of the experience, the
knowledge, the time, and the resources to do the right thing").
304. David Kairys, Law & Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 259
(1984). Kairys uses an analogy to plant closings in which he says that,
although courts tend to bemoan plant closings, the loss of revenue for a
community that has for years given a particular industry tax benefits, and the
end of the sacrifice of toil and trouble of all of the employees within the
community who worked for the plant that is now about to close, both lead
courts to universally conclude that nothing legal can be done to prevent the
closings. The courts reason that the plant closing cannot be prevented by law
because, after all, the capitalist who invests his or her capital has the right to
withdraw it. He argues that it is just as easy to look at the situation and
decide that courts ought to act differently, because, for example, "the
community requires a lien on the plant for all that it contributed.... [T]his
theory serves to place the real social cost of the move on the corporations
rather than on the workers, the community, and the taxpayers who fund the
welfare system." Id. at 258. Our social fabric could change to the point
where such a lien theory would be acceptable; it just has not done so thus far.
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more than fifty percent of the orders that do exist, and unsup-
ported mothers often lack the wherewithal to get it for
themselves.305
It is not as if lawmakers, lawyers, judges, and various sun-
dry others (especially divorced mothers with too many bills and
too few dollars) are unaware of the problem. Some of the pro-
posed solutions are eminently practical. Others are more theo-
retical-and among the latter are ones which despair of ever
solving the problems short of a revolution in thought.3 0 6 But if
the shortcomings are well-known, it makes sense to at least
consider the alternative solutions before adding to the burdens
of an already weakened working class.
For example, the U.S. General Accounting Office found
that "prompt attention by child support collection agencies to
absent parents beginning to pay child support is important to
establish good payment habits. This would include, for exam-
ple, fast and systematic follow up on past due support pay-
ments. '"307 The GAO found this sorely lacking among all the
states it studied. The primary reasons therefor were "inade-
quate staff' 130 and previously, no federal incentive for states to
collect non-AFDC support. 30 9 Federal legislation3 l° already
requires the states to establish procedures for mandatory wage
305. Cf. Lucy E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990) (persons
victimized by discrimination against their race, gender, and/or class are not
protected by the "procedural rituals that are formally available to them").
306. See Christine Harrington & Janet Rifkin, The Gender Organization of
Mediation: Implications for the Feminization of Legal Practice, INST. FOR LEGAL
STUDIES (Feb., 1989); Fineman, supra note 174, at 781 ("A major problem
when law and legal change are viewed as something distinct from or outside
of culture is that such a notion can lead to the conclusion that one can
identify and correct 'errors' in the law, thus correcting the problem, while the
society remains unchanged .... Those who tend to focus on legal change as
the way to social change have it backwards, it seems to me. In my opinion,
the culture must change if there is to be real reform. In the context of
marriage and divorce, this is an inherently pessimistic position, given the
current unlikelihood and impracticality of necessary major cultural changes
concerning gender. A recognition of the difficulty of change, however, does
not allow us to escape the conclusion that law is imbedded in our culture-
that it is culture from which law springs and through which it will be
implemented. If society is not 'ready' for reform, there will be none").
307. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE
MARIO BIAGGI, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, No. B-183433, CHILD SUPPORT
COLLECTION EFFORTS FOR NoN-AFDC FAMILIES 3 (Oct. 30, 1984).
308. Michigan for example cites lack of staff as one reason for delayed
enforcement action for delinquent payors. Id. at 8.
309. The law used to allow the states a 12% incentive for collecting
AFDC support, because all money collected is turned back to state and local
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withholding; impose liens against real and personal property
for amounts of overdue support; and require an individual who
has demonstrated a pattern of delinquent payments to post a
bond, or give some other guarantee to secure payment of over-
due support. These options are available without securing the
complicity of a labor union in the government's collection
efforts.3 1 ' There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
state of California tried other ways to make Wilson and
Senecker support their children.
David Chambers suggests the following possibility:
[I]f a federal system were established under which with-
holding occurred from the first moment of an order and
traveled with the person wherever he took work within
the country, the need for much of the current enforce-
ment system would largely disappear. To make such a
system work, the federal government would need to cre-
ate a national computerized system probably tied to the
man's social security number. Employers would be
required to make a check on a new employee through a
social security office to learn whether support payments
were to be withheld from his wages. Under such a sys-
tem, payments would be nearly perfect except for the
unemployed, the self-employed, and those able to evade
the floating wage assignment by falsifying their social
security numbers or by colluding with the employer."1 2
Among other possible routes for enforcement of child sup-
port are attachment and sequestration of the husband's money
or property within a state, which may provide a wife with reme-
welfare agencies. Now there are incentives for non-AFDC collections. See id.
at 9.
310. Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 651, 653, 658, 664 (1988)) (amending part D of Title IV of the
Social Security Act).
311. There are any number of sources available to litigants, attorneys,
judges, and commentators which explain how child support enforcement can
be improved. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT PROJECT CENTER ON
CHILDREN & THE LAw; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CHILD SUPPORT
REFERENCE MANUAL (1989); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, A GUIDE FOR JUDGES IN CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter A Guide for Judges];
Horowitz, How Private Attorneys Can Use Enforcement, THE MATRIMONIAL
STRATEGIST, at 1 (1975); Gladys Kessler, Crisis in Child Support: Federal
Legislation to Alleviate the Problem, Trial, at 29 (Dec. 1984); Cumens & Cohen,
Enforcement of Child Support Orders Against Self-Employed Obligors, Fair $hare 3
(June 1986).
312. CHAMBERS, supra note 11, at 258-59.
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dies even if the husband is no longer in the state. There are
also the options of garnishment, tax refund interceptions, and
attachment of workers compensation, disability or other bene-
fits."' 3 Finally, equitable remedies and writs that require com-
pliance with court orders must be considered. s 4
Contempt sanctions are also available.31 5 For some rea-
son, judges are reluctant to hold a non-supporting father in
contempt of a court's order.31 6 But it can be an efficacious
method of making fathers pay. Contempt may be "civil" or
"criminal," although there is no clear, practical distinction
either in process or purpose between the two.3 17 Whether the
objective for threatening to or actually jailing a delinquent is
punitive or remedial, "specific and general deterrence are char-
acteristics of both forms of contempt: to tell the particular
offender that the court means business and to send a pointed
message to other scoff laws."3 ' Forty years ago, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which
was meeting to discuss the adoption of a uniform support act,
313. A Guide for Judges, supra note 311, at Chapter 8.
314. Id.
315. A court has had the authority to punish persons who violate its
valid judgments "since the dawn ofjudicial antiquity," Mary G v. Souder, 305
S.W.2d 883, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957). Longer, in fact, than courts have been
willing to find a noncustodial parent obligated to support his own children.
316. The federal Child Support Enforcement Agency reports: "Judges
are frequently reluctant to impose harsh penalties like incarceration, even
though the threat of going to jail is a good inducement to pay." CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, at xii. But see Robert L. Gottsfield,
The Child Support Problem: Credible Threat and Use of Incarceration Works, 26 ARIZ.
L. REV. 12 (1984) (former chief judge of domestic relations division,
Maricopa County, Arizona, argues for "systematic and unbiased" use of
incarceration).
317. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (in a
contempt proceeding a presumption of ability to pay child support violates
the due process clause if the proceeding is criminal rather than civil in
nature); FOOTE ET AL., supra note 169, at 806.
318. FOOTE ET AL., supra note 169, at 806. The irony in Wilson's case,
and likely the case of many other non-supporting fathers who remarry, is that
it is the second wife who eventually must bear the burden of supporting the
children of her husband's first marriage. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Secretary of the
Treasury, 475 U.S. 851 (1986) (father's delinquencies can be satisfied by
interception by funds "owed" to his second wife, as excess earned income
credits which were entirely attributable to her wages and unemployment
compensation benefits). However, where it can be presumed that the second
wife makes her once separate income available to the husband as "family"
resources, it is better to use her money to help keep her husband out of jail
than ask her husband's union to help the state collect.
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agreed that criminal enforcement should be a part of a state's
enforcement powers."1 9
There are other alternatives, including the possibility that
employers assume the burden of discovering whether an
employee has an outstanding child support obligation. 2 °
Another writer has suggested the imposition upon the obligor
to inform employers of his support obligations. "Failure to do
so might make it mandatory for the employer to discharge the
obligor or more effectively impose a 10% civil penalty (to be
paid to the child on the amount due during the unreported
period)." 32 ' By holding in contempt a father who fails to pay
support, the court may send the father to jail until he pays or
agrees to pay. The willingness of a well-organized enforcement
agency to use jail as a sanction has already been demonstrated
to have a significant effect on the proportion of fathers who
make child support payments. 22
A criminal nonsupport proceeding, distinguishable from
contempt as based upon a violation of a separate state statute,
is also a "most powerful weapon, because in some jurisdictions
a criminal nonsupport claim filed by a wife can lead to the
immediate police arrest of the husband. ' 323 A problem associ-
ated with any kind of criminal proceedings, either non-support
or contempt, is that
some courts will not entertain a criminal complaint if the
husband makes any support payments at all, no matter
how inadequate .... Unlike civil contempt, if a husband
is in prison, payment does not lead to automatic release.
Often, however, the husband is put on probation if he
keeps up support payments.32 4
319. WILLIAM BROCKELBANK & FELIX INFAUSTO, INTERSTATE
ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT 17 (1971) ("it was felt that, while actual
extradition would be of little use, the threat of extradition [and criminal
enforcement] might be a powerful weapon in the case of shiftless and slippery
obligors.").
320. CHAMBERS, supra note 11, at 258.
321. See David C. Carrad, A Modest Proposal to End Our National Disgrace,
2 FAM. ADVOC. 31 at 43 (1979), cited in CASSETrY, supra note 158.
322. CHAMBERS, supra note 11.
323. Bryne v. State, 362 So. 2d 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see also
ROBERT MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 234
(1989).
324. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 323, at 234. The efficacy and
the ethics of such methods of enforcing support have often been questioned,
but usually by men. See, e.g., FOOTE ET AL., supra note 169:
[I]mprisonment for nonsupport has obvious disadvantages: it is
expensive for the state and no income for the children is going to be
generated while the fathers are in jail. Its justification despite these
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The most credible critique of incarceration as a means of
enforcing the important obligation of supporting one's child is
that, it too, reflects the current structure of power in our soci-
ety. Chambers, whose research shows that incarceration is
effective, claims to be philosophically opposed to jailing people
for nonpayment of support, in part, because he believes the
sanction is applied unequally. 25 He suggests that many who
are incarcerated are less blameworthy than those who are not.
He found that unskilled blue collar workers and men with
employment difficulties or alcohol problems were over-
represented in jail, while managers and professionals were
under-represented. 326 Tossing deadbeat dads into jail is hardly
the best way to enforce family obligations, but it should not be
overlooked-or so rarely and unfairly applied as to remove it as
any incentive to support one's children.
C. Women as Ordinary Economic Actors Rather Than "Wives"
In determining whether a women would be better off with-
out the benefit of the "protection" of divorce laws, it is apt to
drawbacks, therefore, depends upon its efficacy in specific and
general deterrence: do men who are actually jailed learn their
lesson and pay in the future, and does the threat of jail deter
disobedience to support orders by fathers who otherwise shirk their
obligations?
Id. at 108. According to Harry Krause, "serious questions must be
raised concerning the practice of jailing defaulting parents for civil con-
tempt." HARRY KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPEC-
TIVE (1981). I love Harry Krause's tragic story about a prosperous home
builder:
Certainly civil contempt incarceration for non-payment of support
may be overly harsh and counterproductive in some circumstances.
In one publicized case, a once-prosperous home builder served five
years and five months in a Vermont prison for failing to pay $2550
for support of his wife and nine children-without having had a jury
trial or the benefit of other constitutional safeguards applicable to
accused criminals. While in jail, Mr. Chicoine lost his livelihood,
suffered several heart attacks and cost the state between $10,000-
$14,000 to maintain. His family-on welfare-cost $6,900 per year.
His wife often visited him in prison and said "there's not one night
we didn't pray for him." On release from jail, the state told him
that unless he paid an additional $22,000 to his wife covering the
period during which he was in jail he would be re-imprisoned! If he
might have been able to pay the original amount when the tragedy
started, now he certainly could not pay that or the arrears accrued in
the interim.
Id. at 71-72. One wonders if the prayers culminated in food and shelter for
his nine unsupported children.
325. See CHAMBERS, supra note 11, at 253.
326. Id. at 201-16.
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discuss what protections she might be afforded under ordinary
principles of equity and justice.327
If the state could, for a moment, be theoretically free of all
statutes which treat the family members qua family members
uniquely, there might be different modes of justifying legal
child support duties, establishing the measure of those obliga-
tions, and enforcing those obligations.328 Certain assumptions
are necessary for this theoretical foray. Even without special
"protective" family law statutes, we would need to be in ajuris-
diction which enforces contracts implied in law and one which
recognizes the notions of social contract-i.e. moral obliga-
tions. In such a place, the following scenarios could exist.
With or without the existence of a lawful marriage (that is, one
which complies with statutory procedures) assume a woman
and man live together for ten years. During that time, male
says to female: "If you have and bear children, stay at home
and raise them, I will support you and them." Assume the man
does so for eight years. Assume further, that he leaves this
relationship. The mother could go into a court of equity and
enforce an implied-in-law contract. She could sue for specific
performance, i.e., the man continuing his level of support, or
she could sue for restitution, i.e. what she had to assume to
support those children.3 29 At the same time, of course, the
327. I am indebted to Professor Rodolphe J.A. de Seife for his
explanation of traditional contract law and his willingness to theorize about
the possibility of a remedy for women whose children are unsupported.
328. Elizabeth Cady Stanton in 1860 addressed the New York state
legislature and urged that if marriage were to be viewed as a civil contract,
"let it be subject to the same laws which control all other contracts." Quoted
in FEMINISIM: THE ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRITINGS 113 (Miriam Schneir ed.,
1972).
329. If the female parent received restitution, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979), these remedies might include: § 372,
requiring restoration of a specific thing, or § 345, awarding a sum of money
which "may as justice requires be measured by either, a) the reasonable value
to the other party of what he received in terms of what it would have cost him
[sic] to obtain it from a person in the claimant's position, or b) the extent to
which the other party's property has been increased in value or his other
interests advanced." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1979);
see also Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760), where the court stated:
If the defendant be under an obligation from the ties of natural
justice to refund, the law implies a debt and gives this action
founded in the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it were, upon a
contract ('quasi ex contractu', as the Roman law expresses it) ....
This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought
not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much
encouraged. . . . [Ilt lies from money paid by mistake; or upon a
consideration which happens to fail; or from money got through
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woman and man could have a lawful informal parol contract
based upon an oral agreement (which might otherwise be
unenforceable because of the statute of frauds). The tradi-
tional "if you have children and raise them I will pay for them"
could be a bilateral contract.33 0
Fran Olsen also makes an argument for "neutral" treat-
ment of women and families in another context.33 '
[1It might be objected at this point that the state could
indeed remain neutral with respect to the family by treat-
ing wife-beating, just as it would any other assault and by
applying the same laws of self defense and impaired
capacity to the wife's self help that it would apply
generally.332
She argues that instead of condonation by law officials of wife-
beating, evidenced by the state's policy of "failing to enforce
prohibition ... a policy that empowers wife beaters to act with
the acquiescence of the state . . . . wives should be pro-
tected from assault as stranger-victims would be. Because of
the state's unwillingness to become involved in what it calls
"private misfortune," and its fear of "undermining the positive
values of the private family,' 'a3' women are given less protec-
tion. Of course, the fact that it is mostly impossible to charge a
man with rape if his unwilling sexual partner is his wife,335 sug-
gests the inequity of "special" treatment for families. Women
imposition, (express or implied); or extortion' or oppression; or an
undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to laws
made for the protection of persons under those circumstances. In
one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon
the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice
and equity to refund the money.
Id. at 678, 680-81, reprinted in EDWARD MURPHY & RICHARD SPEIDEL, STUDIES
IN CONTRACT LAW 433 (3d ed. 1986).
330. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1979);JOHN
D. CALMARI &JOSEPH M. PARILLO, CONTRACTS 18 (3d ed. 1987).
331. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1509 n.53 (1983).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1510 n.54.
334. Id. at 1509 n.50.
335. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962) which recommends
against the crime of marital rape in nearly every case where there is no
serious aggravation because marriage suggests a "kind of generalized
consent" to intercourse. Cf. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982).
For an excellent summary of state laws on marital rape and an interesting
analysis of the argument for criminalizing unwanted intercourse between
married people, see Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990).
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would fare much better under ordinary criminal or tort
rules.33 6
In the post-divorce legal context, even if the state were to
remain "neutral" in establishing the level of support needed
when the noncustodial, higher-earning parent is initially
assessed a support obligation, the custodial parent would likely
fare better. The new "fair" revised judicial guidelines for
establishing child support obligations, which have significantly
increased the levels but have not yet matched the real needs of
the children being supported,33 7 would likely net less than a
suit in contract. There may also be the possibility of a tortious
interference with a contract claim, if the harm is foreseeable,
and if the father committed acts which forced the mother to
breach her promise. A woman could likewise sue in quasi-con-
tract for restitution.
Intervention by the state into family relations has often
proved to be the least effective weapon for females. The legal
treatment of women and children, and this "see how far we will
go this one time to help you out" foray by the California courts
may be a practical demonstration of the theory of Mari Mat-
suda: "The ideas emanating from feminist legal theorists and
legal scholars of color have important points of intersection
that assist in the fundamental inquiries ofjurisprudence: What
is injustice and what does law have to do with it."' 3 38 Were the
state to treat females as juridical equals of men, and treat their
relationships with men the same as their relationships with
strangers in the market place, women may do much better.
Alternatively, the state could treat women preferentially, by
radicalizing and reforming the hierarchical notions, recogniz-
ing that because of women's lesser economic power and
because of the familial obligations that inure only to women in
336. See also Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977),
rev'd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), aft'd, 393 N.E.2d 976, (1979);
Raymond I. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L.
REV. 914.
337. For example, a father of three with a net income of $50,000, under
current law, may be assessed $1400 a month toward his children's support.
This amount, which sounds generous, certainly is insufficient for raising three
children. Even if we presume that the mother is capable of paying her own
rent, the average rent for a three bedroom house in a community of 5,000 is
about $600. Subtract $150 for the mother's share. Presume, modestly, $120
a week for food, $100 a week for daycare, and a few extra line items, such as
insurance, medical expenses, and clothing. The recommended guidelines
would only maintain these children at just above poverty level.
338. Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989).
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our culture, they should be compensated and treated differ-
ently than men. 39
VI. CONCLUSION
The irony of a critique of the way courts try to help is that
their reasoned response may be to cease trying. What can
judges do? They, as guardians and makers of law, are faced
with often irreconcilable demands. The interests I present are
not atypical in their seeming inconsistency. Should we not
applaud, rather than attack, an effort to make fathers pay?
The problem with what happened in these two cases is that
they represent one result when two disfavored "outsiders" are
juxtaposed in a legal battle, if judicial responses are indeed
colored by cultural understandings and personal notions of
what is right. They also inappropriately suggest that every
effort to enforce child support is being undertaken; that is sim-
ply not true. Theoretically, if any benefit inures to women, who
occupy one of the lower rungs on a socio-economic ladder, it
derives from a burden added to unions, who likewise share the
space at the bottom. Consequently, no meaningful redistribu-
tion of power takes place. Unless we accept an immutable hier-
archy as necessary for our survival, it makes no sense to avoid
changing the way things work.
Although women suffer dramatically after divorce, very lit-
tle of their pain derives from the fact that some men get jobs
out of hiring halls, and the wages of those men can rarely be
attached. For the former Mizzes Senecker and Wilson, I sup-
pose, anything would help. These women had no child support
for the dozen or so years it took the state to determine how to
collect it. While they were waiting, millions more dollars in
child support were never paid, and, it seems, no one did much
about that. It is not clear that these two women ever got the
meager support some judge ordered their husbands to pay.
What is clear is that unions, which have precious little eco-
nomic power right now, have an additional duty that could sub-
ject them to liability in tort. Workers' collectives, which have
339. Actually, preferential rather than neutral treatment would be
better for women who support their own children, because as Olsen argues,
state neutrality, such as the state's refusal to become involved in family
affairs, means the ratification and reinforcement of social roles within the
family that were openly hierarchical. See, e.g., California Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (California's law that guaranteed a
pregnant woman that her job would be protected during a limited maternity
leave was found not to violate Title VII's prohibitions against sex
discrimination).
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been prohibited from engaging in any kind of social activism,
have been told to help the state collect child support. And
women, who will continue to suffer invidious discrimination in
the workplace, being the primary caretakers of children before
divorce, and sole providers for them after divorce, have been
offered a bone. Perhaps the well-meaning and inspired jurists
and legislators can be moved to seek other avenues to put
women and children first when a marriage falls apart.
